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Anxiety disorders affect about 28.8% of the United States population at some 
time in their lifetime. Current theoretical models of anxiety disorders include cognitive 
constructs that are believed to play a crucial role in the etiology and maintenance of these 
disorders. Intolerance of uncertainty is one such cognitive construct, and it has been 
defined as a negative emotional, cognitive, or behavioral response to uncertain situations 
and events. Intolerance of uncertainty results in selective encoding and interpretation of 
information, such that people with high intolerance of uncertainty pay more attention to 
uncertain stimuli, go through greater elaborative encoding of uncertain information, have 
enhanced recollection of uncertain stimuli, and have a greater tendency to interpret such 
stimuli as threatening. Studies investigating processing biases in intolerance of 
uncertainty have used verbal-linguistic stimuli and have assessed biases during the 
interpretive and elaborative phase of information processing. The current study 
investigates intolerance of uncertainty as a moderator in the relationship between anxiety 
  
and information processing biases. Attention biases were assessed with the emotional 
Stroop task (using neutral words, threatening words, and words denoting uncertainty), 
and the dot-probe task (using photographs displaying faces with neutral or fearful 
expression). Contrary to our hypothesis, IU was not a moderator in the relationship 
between anxiety and automatic information processing biases. Additionally, we found no 
evidence of a relationship between IU and reaction times in the emotional Stroop and dot-
probe task. Unexpectedly, the current study did not demonstrate a relationship between 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Anxiety disorders affect about 28.8% of the United States population at some 
time in their lifetime (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005). 
People diagnosed with anxiety disorders often report experiencing unrelenting feelings of 
worry, apprehension, nervousness, and fear (Antony, Orsillo, & Roemer, 2001). These 
feelings are typically accompanied by a future-focused sense of uncontrollability and 
unpredictability (Suárez, Bennett, Goldstein, & Barlow, 2009), which is best captured in 
the construct of intolerance of uncertainty (IU; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004). 
Research indicates that anxious people tend to process information in a way that 
reconfirms their view of the world as an uncontrollable, unpredictable, and ultimately 
dangerous place (Ouimet, Gawrinski, & Dozois, 2009). Several theoretical models of 
anxiety disorders have proposed that IU plays a crucial role in the etiology and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders and in how individuals with anxiety process 
information (Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). A better 
understanding of the role of IU would lead to better theoretical models of anxiety and 
would inform treatment of anxiety disorders. The focus of the current study is to 
elucidate the relationship between IU, anxiety, and information processing biases 
commonly observed in anxious people (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). In particular, the current study investigated 
whether IU is a moderator of the relationship between anxiety and biases in the automatic 
stages of processing ambiguous and threatening information. 
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Anxiety and Information Processing Biases  
Biased information processing is at the center of a number of current theoretical 
models of emotional disorders (Rapee, 2001; Mogg, & Bradley, 1998; Mathews, & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Eysenck, 1992; Beck, & Clark, 1997; Clark, & Wells, 1995; Woody, 
& Rachman, 1994; Ohman, 1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Foa & 
Kozak, 1986).  Mathews and MacLeod (2005) note that biased information processing in 
people with emotional disorders is not narrow, deficient, incorrect, or distorted. It rather 
involves selective information processing that is biased towards mood congruent 
material, resulting in higher-than-normal vigilance for the mood congruent stimuli 
(McNally & Reese, 2009). Research indicates that information processing biases in 
people with anxiety disorders tend to reconfirm the anxious person’s view of the world as 
a dangerous place (Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009). 
Early cognitive theories of the etiology of anxiety proposed that anxiety is the 
result of enhanced automatic encoding of threatening stimuli, retrieval of the same, and 
proliferation of anxiety schemata (Beck, 1976). Other theories propose that anxiety 
results from interpretation of uncertain stimuli as threatening and that cognitive resources 
are disproportionately allocated towards threatening stimuli during later, elaborative, and 
interpretative processes (Bower, 1983; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & 
Painter, 1997; Mathews, & Mackintosh, 1998;). Although these theories propose different 
timelines and mechanisms of the automatic cognitive processes that enhance and 
maintain anxiety, both views predict facilitated processing of threatening stimuli. Later 
theories combine the two ideas and propose that the attention of anxious individuals is 
immediately captured by threatening stimuli, and attentional resources are 
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disproportionately allocated to processing these stimuli during the initial, automatic 
stages of processing (Amir, Coles, & Foa, 2002; Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992; 
Mogg et al, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Williams et al., 1997). 
The preferential automatic processing is followed by sustained selective semantic 
elaboration of threatening stimuli (Beck & Clark, 1997), threatening interpretation of 
uncertain stimuli (Eysenck, 1992), or avoidance resulting in failure to assess threat 
accurately and failure to habituate to threatening stimuli (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; 
Mogg et al, 1997; Williams et al., 1997). 
The early automatic stages of information processing include attention and 
encoding processes. Anxious individuals are particularly sensitive to threat and 
automatically direct their attention to threatening stimuli and prioritize such stimuli for 
encoding before others.  They have difficulty habituating to seemingly threatening stimuli 
that do not pose danger or have difficulty disengaging attention from the threatening 
features of a stimulus to attend to features indicating safety. Additionally, Mathews 
(1990) suggested that anxious individuals engage in constant automatic evaluation of 
their surroundings for possible threatening stimuli, resulting in symptoms of 
hypervigilance and heightened startle responses (Mobini & Grant, 2007).  
The existing evidence for threat-related cognitive biases in anxiety disorders is the 
result of numerous experimental studies using various cognitive tests, many of which 
target attentional processes. In addition to the mere presence of attentional biases, these 
studies have explored other factors that affect the magnitude of information processing 
biases. These moderating factors include, among others, level of anxiety, specific anxiety 
disorders, comorbidity, stimulus awareness, specific type of cognitive task (Bar-Haim, 
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Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Krannnenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). Bar-Haim et al. 
(2007) conducted a meta-analysis investigating the magnitude and moderators of 
information processing biases in anxiety. They found a threat-related bias that was 
similar across diverse anxiety disorders and concluded that this bias, rather than being 
disorder specific, may be related to a possible mechanism that underlies both anxiety and 
anxiety disorders.  
Many experimental paradigms have been developed in order to investigate 
processing biases in attention, memory, interpretation, judgment, and reasoning. The 
most notable examples of these experimental paradigms include the emotional Stroop, 
dot-probe, emotional spatial cuing, and visual search paradigms (Bar-Heim et al, 2007). 
The emotional Stroop and dot-probe tasks have been crucial in investigating biases in 
attention and specific aspects of attention such as attention allocation, automaticity, or 
timeline of attention allocation and withdrawal (Shalev & Algom, 2000; Ouimet, 
Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Anxiety 
The construct of IU first emerged in generalized anxiety disorder literature in 
1994 (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). In the 20 years since 
then, the efforts to conceptualize IU have yielded interpretations as a dispositional 
characteristic, a personality trait, a cognitive process, and as a cognitive filter (Dugas and 
Robichaud, 2007; Dugas, Hedayati, Karavidas, Buhr, Francis, & Philips, 2005; Fisher & 
Wells, 2009). The resulting definitions have described IU as biased perception, 
interpretation, or as negative emotional/cognitive/behavioral response to uncertain 
situations and events (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Dugas et al., 2005; Dugas, Buhr, & 
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Ladouceur, 2004; Freeston et al., 1994). Researchers have identified several behavioral 
operationalizations of intolerance of uncertainty which include avoidance, inability to act, 
attempts to control the future, all-or-nothing responses in cases of uncertainty (Yook, 
Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010), heightened startle response (Nelson & Shankman, 2011), 
heightened information-seeking (Starcevic & Berle, 2006), and difficulties with decision-
making (Krain, Hefton, Pine, Ernst, Castellanos, Klein, & Milham, 2006). The current 
study adopts an understanding of IU as a cognitive process, defined as biased perception 
and interpretation of stimuli denoting uncertainty and threat, and operationalized as 
heightened information-seeking and difficulties with decision-making. 
People with high IU perceive uncertain and novel events as stressful and upsetting 
(Carleton, 2012). They further interpret such events as negative, threatening, and unfair. 
They are unable to tolerate the possibility of a negative outcome, even if the probability 
of such outcome is very small (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; Dugas et al., 2005).  
It has been suggested that heightened IU results in selective encoding and 
interpretation of information, greater elaborative encoding of uncertain statements, 
enhanced recollection of uncertain material, and greater tendency to interpret such stimuli 
as threatening (Dugas et al., 2005). Preferential encoding of threatening information, 
threatening interpretation of uncertain stimuli, and preferential retrieval of threatening 
information results in extreme concern and worry when any physical or psychological 
peril is present (Koerner, 2008).  
Research aiming to investigate the relationship between anxiety, worry, IU, and 
information processing shows there are significant relationships between and among each 
of these constructs (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011).  Koerner and Dugas (2008) conducted a 
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study investigating the relationship between IU, anxiety, and information processing and 
concluded that IU is a unique contributor that defines the experience of anxiety beyond 
anxiety symptoms. Further research is needed to explore how IU and worry impact the 
well-established relationship between anxiety and information processing biases (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Krannnenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). 
The Role of Intolerance of Uncertainty in Anxiety Disorders 
IU was initially conceptualized as a construct strongly related with worry and 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000). Recent research 
indicates that IU is a construct that defines the experience of anxiety and is not 
necessarily restricted to a specific diagnosis of GAD (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). For 
example, recent studies have identified a relationship between IU and obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Lind & Boschen, 2009), social anxiety (Carleton, Collimore, & 
Asmundson, 2010), panic disorder with agoraphobia (Buhr & Dugas, 2009), and even 
depression (de Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009).  
IU is correlated with other anxiety constructs that play an important role in the 
etiology and maintenance of different anxiety disorders, such as worry (de Jong-Meyer et 
al., 2009), anxiety sensitivity (Carleton, Sharpe, Asmundson, 2007), and fear of anxiety. 
Recent studies indicate that enhancing negative interpretive biases increases vulnerability 
to stress (White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011; Eldar, Ricon, & Bar-Haim, 2008; 
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). Chen and Hong (2010) 
investigated the role of IU in heightening anxiety levels in the presence of daily hassles. 
The researchers found that IU moderated the role of daily stress on the experience of 
anxiety. They suggested that the heightened levels of anxiety were the result of increased 
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perceived threat as individuals with increased levels of anxiety perceived uncertain 
elements of the situations as threatening.   
Distinction between Intolerance of Uncertainty and Worry   
While the focus of the proposed study is on IU, it is important to note a second, 
related construct, that of worry.  Worry was first defined as an uncontrollable chain of 
thoughts charged with negative affect (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983), 
aiming to solve problems with uncertain outcomes, especially when some of these 
outcomes may be negative. Worry has also been conceptualized as an anticipatory 
cognitive process that is characterized by the tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli as 
threatening, the tendency to predict negative outcomes for uncertain events, and the 
tendency to overestimate risk (Ladouseur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). It has been 
characterized as fear-producing thoughts and images related to everyday-life experiences 
that have the potential to result in adverse consequences (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; 
Taylor, Thordarson, Sochting, 2002). These thoughts and images are thought to be 
uncontrollable, excessive, repetitive, and to remain unresolved in the absence of 
intervention (Mathews, & Funke, 2006).  
According to cognitive theories of anxiety, worry is related to threat schemata in 
an individual’s long-term memory (Mathews, & Funke, 2006). When these threat 
schemata are activated, they may increase vigilance for internal or external threats (e.g. 
negative evaluation or harm, respectively). The preferential processing of threatening 
stimuli, also known as biased information processing, can have causal effects on the 
etiology and maintenance of anxiety and worry (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). The 
variables that have been proposed as predictors of excessive worry are: IU, beliefs that 
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worry has a protective function, negative orientation towards problem situations, and 
cognitive avoidance (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). The relationship 
between IU and worry remains strong even after taking into account anxiety and 
depression (Buhr, & Dugas, 2006; Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Boelen, Vrinssen, & van Tulder, 
2010; de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2007; de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2006; Dugas, 
Gosselin, Ladouceur, 2001). When faced with an uncertain future, individuals with 
anxiety engage in repetitive cognitions, also known as worry, focused on solving and 
preparing for the unknown problem waiting for them in the unknown future (Boswell, 
Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Depression  
Numerous studies have investigated underlying mechanisms, cognitive processes, 
and dimensional traits shared by anxiety and depression in the attempt to explain the 
comorbidity between the two and develop better treatments (Querstret & Cropley, 2013; 
Bauer, Wilansky-Traynor, & Rector, 2012; Kaufman & Charney, 2000). Yook et al. 
(2010) theorized that individuals with high IU may experience negative affect and low 
self-esteem due to their bleak outlook for the future and worry that they do not possess 
sufficient problem solving skills to manage this uncertain future. Anticipation of negative 
events is a feature associated with IU, anxiety, and depression.  This high comorbidity 
indicates that depression is a correlate that may influence information processing biases. 
A more detailed review of the relationship between depression, anxiety, and IU can be 
found in Appendix 1. 
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Measuring Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Many studies investigating processing biases in worry and IU have used verbal-
linguistic stimuli and have assessed biases during the interpretative and elaborative phase 
of information processing (Dugas et al., 2005; Rassin & Muris, 2005; Koerner & Dugas, 
2008). Dugas et al. (2005) reasoned that words are the ideal medium for investigating 
biases in information processing in worriers and people with high intolerance of 
uncertainty, because verbal-linguistic processes predominate in worry.  
Freeston et al. (1994) constructed the first measure to assess IU, the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS), a 27 item, 5-point Likert scale that has shown high internal 
consistency and 5-week test-retest reliability (Norton, 2005; Buhr & Dugas, 2002).  The 
IUS was designed to assess the belief that uncertainty is stressful, upsetting, unfair, 
negative, to be avoided, and leaves one unable to act. Several factor analyses have 
attempted to identify the factor structure of IU and have yielded inconsistent conclusions 
with regards to the number of factors and the dimensions or latent constructs reflected in 
the factors (Freeston et al, 1994; Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Norton, 2005; Carleton et al, 
2007; Berenbaum et al, 2008; Sexton & Dugas, 2009). Factors that have been identified 
within these studies include: the belief that uncertainty has negative repercussions, the 
feeling that uncertainty is damaging and unfair (Sexton & Dugas, 2009; Buhr & Dugas, 
2002); the need for predictability, inaction in the face of uncertainty, experiencing 
uncertainty as distressing, and inflexible beliefs about uncertainty (Berenbaum et al, 
2008; Buhr & Dugas, 2002); anxiety, and avoidance (Carleton et al, 2007).  McEvoy and 
Mahoney (2011) suggested that these inconsistencies may be due to diversity in the 
severity of anxiety and IU experienced by participants across studies.  Some of these 
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studies employed participants with non-clinical levels of anxiety and IU which may have 
led to more homogenous answers, while others employed participants with clinical levels 
of anxiety which may have led to answers revealing a multidimensional structure of IU.  
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Information Processing Biases  
Biases in information processing play a meaningful role in the etiology and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders. Our understanding of the magnitude of the relationship 
between information processing biases and anxiety disorders comes as the result of a 
wealth of theoretical discussion and research. Similarly, a better understanding of IU 
requires an investigation of accompanying information processing biases during all stages 
of processing. Dugas et al. (2005) were among the first to investigate information 
processing biases in relation to IU after noting a lack of research on the topic. The goal of 
their work was to identify how IU influenced information processing and how that, in 
turn, led to excessive worry and anxiety. The authors focused on biases in recall of 
material denoting uncertainty, and biases in interpretation of uncertain situations. They 
found that IU led to better recall of material denoting uncertainty and threatening 
interpretation of uncertain situations. The materials used in these experiments included a 
word list and fictitious diary entries (Davey, 1993). These findings were replicated by 
Koerner-Singh (2008) using both vignettes and pictorial stimuli. Carleton (2012) 
proposed that IU is associated with automatic information processing biases. Individuals 
with high IU are faster at identifying uncertain stimuli compared to neutral ones, pointing 
to facilitated engagement towards uncertain stimuli (Fergus, Bardeen, & Wu, 2013). 
Current research has employed cognitive tasks that shed light on the relationship between 
IU and interpretation of ambiguous or threatening stimuli. An understanding of the 
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relationship between IU and information processing in the automatic stages of 
information processing requires the use of experimental paradigms that target early stages 
of processing such as the Stroop and dot-probe tasks. 
Emotional Stroop. The classic Stroop task was designed to investigate the 
interference of the semantic characteristics of the word with the physical characteristics 
of the print or the interference of names of colors with the color of the ink used to print 
the words (Stroop, 1935).  Phaf and Kan (2007) explained that the delay in naming the 
ink color of words compared to strings of meaningless symbols is the result of 
simultaneous automatic processing of the color of print and the semantic meaning of the 
word, which is absent in the case of meaningless strings of symbols.  
In the emotional Stroop task, the participants are asked to name the color of the 
ink for words that have emotionally neutral or emotionally relevant meaning. Numerous 
studies have indicated that people with emotional difficulties take longer to name the 
color of emotional words compared to neutral words, while people in control groups do 
not show such effect (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). This bias has been 
explained as the result of attention being automatically directed towards the emotional 
characteristics of the word processed simultaneously with naming the color of the print 
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) reviewed studies 
investigating threat-related attentional biases using the emotional Stroop task in 1467 
individuals. The researchers found a significant threat-related bias in adults and children 
with high anxiety or anxiety disorders.  
Dot Probe. The dot-probe task was designed to investigate attention biases 
towards threatening material (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In the dot-probe task 
12 
 
the participants are presented simultaneously with a threatening and a nonthreatening 
stimulus. After a brief presentation, the stimuli are removed and one of them is replaced 
with a probe. The participants are asked to respond to the probe as quickly and accurately 
as possible. It is assumed that the participants will react faster when the probe replaces 
the stimulus to which they were attending at the onset of the probe. Numerous studies 
have indicated that people with emotional difficulties are faster at reacting to the probe 
when it replaces the threatening stimulus rather than when it replaces the neutral stimulus 
(Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009). The dot-probe task has been used in many studies 
aiming to investigate selective attention biases in people with anxiety (Frewen, Dozois, 
Joanisse, & Neufeld, 2008). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) reviewed 35 studies, including 659 
individuals that used the dot-probe paradigm. The researchers found that the dot probe 
paradigm was effective in detecting the differences between anxious and non-anxious 
individuals. McKay, Thoma, and Pilecki (2009) explained that the observed bias in the 
dot-probe task is the result of enhanced attention towards threatening stimuli or lower 
threshold for detecting threat. Similarly to the emotional Stroop task, attention biases 
towards anxiety-provoking material in the dot-probe task have been associated with key 
cognitive constructs such as worry (McKay, 2005) and anxiety sensitivity (Hunt, Keogh, 
& French, 2006). 
Bar-Heim et al (2007) found that the emotional Stroop task and the dot-probe task 
yielded effect sizes that were statistically similar across anxiety disorders. The correlation 
between results obtained with the emotional Stroop and dot-probe paradigms in both 
subliminal and supraliminal versions indicate that these tasks target similar constructs 
(Egloff & Hock, 2003). These studies have observed bias for both general threat 
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information and for information that is consistent with the specific concerns of the 
diagnosed anxiety disorder, indicating an underlying non-specific anxiety component 
common for all anxiety disorders (McKay, Thoma, & Pilecki, 2009).  
Current Study 
The purpose of the current study is to investigate the influence of IU on the 
relationship between anxiety and attentional processing biases. IU has been identified as 
a cognitive construct that contributes uniquely to the experience of anxiety beyond 
anxiety symptoms (Koerner and Dugas, 2008). Numerous studies have investigated the 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and interpretive biases (Dugas et al 2005; 
Kirsch & Windmann, 2009; Koerner-Singh, 2008; Koerner & Dugas, 2008; Robichaud, 
Dugas, & Conway, 2003); however, most of them have employed experimental 
paradigms that rely on explicit, top-down, evaluative processes. This association has been 
investigated by employing tasks that require high levels of semantic analysis and 
synthesis (Clark & Beck, 2011). Thus, current research indicates that there is an 
association between intolerance of uncertainty and strategic, intentional, and conscious 
processes, yet there is very little research exploring the association between intolerance 
of uncertainty and automatic information processing. The aim of this study is to 
investigate the association between intolerance of uncertainty and involuntary, 
unintentional, automatic processes by employing tasks that require a comparatively low 
level of cognitive processing and minimal semantic analysis and synthesis (Clark & 
Beck, 2011), i.e. the emotional Stroop task and the dot-probe task.  
Another purpose of this study is to investigate IU as a moderator in the 
relationship between anxiety and information processing biases. The relationship between 
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anxiety and information processing biases is well documented, and more recent studies 
have focused on identifying mediators and moderators influencing this relationship 
(Eysenck, 1992; Mitte, 2008). IU has been identified as a construct moderating the 
relationship between anxiety and memory of threatening information, which suggests that 
IU could be a construct moderating the relationship between anxiety and automatic 
information processing of threatening stimuli. This study aims to investigate the role of 
IU as a moderator in the relationship between anxiety and information processing as 
indicated in the performance in the emotional Stroop and the dot-probe tasks.     
Primary Aims and Hypotheses  
Aim 1. The primary aim of the current study is to investigate the relationship 
between severity of intolerance of uncertainty and magnitude of attentional information 
processing biases.  
Hypothesis 1. It is hypothesized that severity of intolerance of uncertainty will be 
positively correlated to reaction time in the trials involving words denoting uncertainty 
and threat in the emotional Stroop task.  
Hypothesis 2. It is hypothesized that severity of intolerance of uncertainty will be 
negatively correlated to reaction time in the trials involving fearful faces in the dot-probe 
task. 
Aim 2. The secondary aim of this study is to explore the role of intolerance of 
uncertainty in the relationship between anxiety and information processing biases. 
Hypothesis 3. It is hypothesized that intolerance of uncertainty will be a 
moderator in the relationship between anxiety and information processing biases, such 
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that higher intolerance of uncertainty will strengthen the relationship between anxiety and 
reaction time in the trials involving fearful faces in the dot-probe task. 
Hypothesis 4. It is hypothesized that intolerance of uncertainty will be a 
moderator in the relationship between anxiety and information processing biases, such 
that higher intolerance of uncertainty will strengthen the relationship between anxiety and 
reaction time in the trials involving words denoting uncertainty and threat in the 
emotional Stroop task. 
Exploratory Aim and Hypothesis 
Aim 3. An exploratory aim of this study was to investigate the unique 
contributions of trait anxiety, worry, and intolerance of uncertainty to information 
processing biases as evidenced by longer latencies in reaction time in the emotional 





Chapter 2: Method 
Sample characteristics 
Participants for this study were 110 college students at the University of 
Maryland, College Park. Participants were 65.8% female, and ranged in age from 18 to 
24, with a mean age of 19.43 (SD = 1.77). The students were all undergraduates (51.4% 
freshmen, 24.3% sophomores, 14.4% juniors, 9% seniors). The study sample was diverse 
with regard to race and ethnicity: 8.1% of the participants identified as African-
American, 14.4% identified as Asian-American,  62.2% identified as Caucasian, 8.1% 
identified as Hispanic American, 6.3% identified as other and did not specify their race or 
ethnicity, and .9% did not complete that part of the Demographics Questionnaire.  
Procedures 
Recruitment 
The participants in this study were students registered to take undergraduate 
psychology courses that encouraged research participation and were awarded class credit. 
The students were directed to the Sona system 
(http://psychology.umd.edu/research/sona.html), where they were able to sign up for the 
study. The students were informed that the study examined the effects of individual 
characteristics in information processing of emotional information. The inclusion criteria 
for the study were that each participant be at least 18 years of age and a student at the 
University of Maryland, College Park. The exclusion criterion was a diagnosis of any 
psychotic disorder at any point during the participant’s lifetime, which was assessed with 
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders (SCID). No participants met the 




Prior to the laboratory procedures, the students were randomly assigned to one of 
the Order of Procedures groups, which determined whether the participants would first 
complete the emotional Stroop or dot-probe task first. The participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of the Order of Stimulus Emotion groups, which determined the 
order of emotion in the emotional Stroop task (neutral, fearful, denoting uncertainty).  
Laboratory Session  
The participants were informed that the laboratory procedure for this study could 
last up to 142 minutes. The length of the procedure was strongly dependent on the time it 
took to administer the SCID. Previous studies with the same student population indicated 
that the time necessary to complete the SCID ranges from 30 – 90 minutes (Spitzer, 
Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1996; First & Gibbon, 2004). In the current study, the time to 
complete the SCID ranged from 25 – 40 minutes. An overview of the procedures is 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 2 Laboratory Protocol 
Time Procedure 1 Time Procedure 2 
T – 10   Informed Consent T – 10   Informed Consent 
T – 5  Emotional Stroop Task instructions T – 5  Dot-probe instructions 
T 0 Emotional Stroop Task T 0 Dot-probe Task 
T + 10 Dot-probe task info T + 10 Emotional Stroop instructions 
T + 15 Dot-probe Task T + 15 Emotional Stroop Task 
T + 25 Demographic Questionnaire T + 25 Demographic Questionnaire 
T + 27 IUS T + 27 IUS 
T + 31 PSWQ T + 31 PSWQ 
T + 35 BAI T + 35 BAI 
T + 40 BDI-II T + 40 BDI-II 
T + 45 SCID-IV T + 45 SCID-IV 
T + 135  Debriefing and Conclusion  T + 135  Debriefing and Conclusion  
Note: IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BAI = Beck 





Informed Consent. The participants were provided with a written description of 
the study procedures and asked to complete a written consent form. The participants were 
also informed verbally about the procedures involved in the study, the potential risks of 
this study, issues pertaining to confidentiality, and their rights as participants (e.g., that 
they have the right to withdrawal from the study at any point in time). 
Cognitive Tasks. The participants completed the emotional Stroop task or the dot-
probe task. Each task took no longer than 10 minutes to complete. 
Assessment Procedures. The participants were asked to complete the 
demographics questionnaire, IUS, PSWQ, BAI, and BDI-II. After completing the self- 
report questionnaires, the participants were asked to complete the SCID.  
Debriefing and Conclusion. Upon the completion of all tasks and assessment 
measures the participants were given more detailed information about the purpose of the 
study: investigating information processing biases in relationship with intolerance of 
uncertainty, theoretical models of information processing biases, and how the tasks 
completed by the participants relate to the purpose of the study. All participants were 
provided with referrals to mental health professionals, obtained from an established 
referral list already in use at the University of Maryland Psychology Clinic, in case any of 
them were left with questions they wanted to discuss with a mental health professional as 
a result of the assessment procedures. 
Measures  
Demographic Variables  
The demographic questionnaire was administered to obtain data on the 
participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, and education. (Appendix C), for the purpose of 
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including these variables into the model if they showed significant associations with 
reaction time, in order to control for their effect. 
Key Measures 
Reaction time. Reaction time (RT) was the dependent variable in both the dot-
probe and the emotional Stroop task. In the dot-probe task RT was the time it took for the 
participants to indicate the orientation of the arrow following one of the photographs 
presented on the computer screen. In the emotional Stroop task RT was the time that it 
took for the participant to indicate the color of the print, by pressing buttons on a 
keyboard. 
Emotional Stroop Task. The emotional Stroop task included a training phase and 
one test phase. The test phase included 8 trials and the test phase included 120 trials. 
Each trial began with a fixation mark presented in the center of the laptop screen for 500 
milliseconds. The fixation mark was followed by a word typed in one of four colors (red, 
green, yellow, and blue) for 500 milliseconds. The word was replaced by a blank screen 
in which the participants were allowed up to 1400 milliseconds to indicate the color of 
the word before the next trial began. Participants were asked to press one of four response 
buttons as quickly and accurately as possible. The trial ended when a participant pressed 
a button or at the end of the response window. The color and certainty valence of the 
words were balanced throughout the trials.  
Word List. The word stimuli consisted of 15 words (5 neutral, 5 threatening, and 
5 denoting uncertainty). The word list was created by Dugas et al. (2005) and the words 
were matched on basis of length, written frequency, familiarity, concreteness, 
imaginability, and syntactic function.  
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Dot Probe Task. The dot-probe task included a training phase and one test phase. 
The test phase included 8 trials and the test phase included 100 trials. Each trial will 
begin with a fixation mark presented in the center of the laptop screen for 500 
milliseconds. The fixation mark was followed by a face display for 500 milliseconds. The 
face display was replaced by an arrow, oriented up or down, which appeared in the 
location of the previously viewed fearful face (threat congruent trial) or happy face 
(threat incongruent trial) for 200 milliseconds. The arrow was replaced by a blank screen 
in which the participants were allowed up to 1400 milliseconds to indicate the arrow 
orientation before the next trial begins. Participants were asked to press the right or left 
arrow on a keyboard as quickly and accurately as possible. The trial ended when a 
participant pressed a button or at the end of the response window. The location of the 
fearful face, the location of the probe, and the orientation of the probe were balanced 
across trials. 
Pictures of Faces. The picture stimuli consisted of photographs of faces, each 
shown both with a happy and fearful expression. The photographs are part of the 
NimStim databases of photographs of faces displaying a variety of emotions, with fear 
and happiness as two of the possible emotions (Tottenham, Tanaka, Leon, McCarry, 
Nurse, Hare, Marcus, Westerlund, Casey,  Nelson, in press; Gur, Sara, Hagendoorn, 
Marom, Hughett, Macy, Turner, Bajcsy, Posner, Gur, 2002).  
IUS. IUS is a self-report assessment instrument intended to measure the emotional 
and behavioral consequences of feelings of uncertainty, how feelings of uncertainty 
reflect on one’s character, the expectation of a predictable future, frustration with 
unpredictability, efforts to control the future, and inflexible answers in response to 
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uncertainty (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994).  Reliability studies 
have demonstrated that IUS has excellent internal consistency with α = .95, and good 5-
week test-retest reliability with r = .74 (Buhr & Dugas, 2000). The IUS has shown good 
validity when used alongside measures of worry, r’s = .53 and .63, and trait anxiety, r = 
.57 (Freeston et al., 1994; Buhr & Dugas, 2000). In addition to the high correlation 
between measures of intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety or worry, intolerance of 
uncertainty has shown to be a unique contributor to the experience of anxiety beyond 
anxiety symptoms (Koerner & Dugas, 2008).  
PSWQ. PSWQ is a self-report questionnaire intended to measure the intensity of a 
tendency to excessive pathological worry, without reference to the content of worries 
(Robichaud et al, 2003; Roemer, 2001). The PSWQ has demonstrated good 2 to 10-week 
test-retest reliability in college samples with r’s ranging from .74 to .93, and very good 
internal consistency with α ranging from .86 to .93. The PSWQ has shown good validity 
when used alongside measures of worry, r’s = .59 and .67, and anxiety, r’s = .40 to .74 
(Davey, 1993; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).  
BAI. The BAI is a 21-item self-report questionnaire intended to measure typical 
features of anxiety (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The BAI has demonstrated 
good 1 to 5-week test-retest reliability with r’s ranging from .75 to .83 (Beck & Steer, 
1993) and very good internal consistency with α ranging from .85 to .93 (de Beurs, 
Wilson, Chambless, Goldstein, & Feske, 1997). The BAI has shown good validity when 
used alongside measures of anxiety, r’s = .51 and .69 (Osman, Kopper, Barrios, Osman, 
& Wade, 1997). 
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Structured Clinical Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders Axis I Disorders (SCID). The SCID is a semi-structured interview based on the 
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria and is the most widely used assessment instrument in the 
United States (First & Gibbon, 2004). The SCID is organized in modules that cover 
psychological disorders in accordance with DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. This instrument 
was chosen because it is a widely used diagnostic instrument with good psychometric 
properties and it has been suggested as a good candidate for assigning diagnostic status in 
research studies (Antony, & Rowa, 2005). The SCID was used to test the primary 
hypothesis of this study, which states that participants with an anxiety disorder will show 
impairment in implicit memory. The reliability of the SCID has been investigated using 
joint or videotaped interviews and has produced kappas ranging from 0.70 to 1.00 
(Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1996). The validity of the SCID has been more 
challenging to measure; however, studies to date comparing it to standard clinical 
interviews reveal good validity, with kappa coefficients ranging from .57 to .76.    
BDI-II. The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire intended to measure 
typical symptoms of depression (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II has 
demonstrated good few hours to several months test-retest reliability with r ’s ranging 
from .48 to 0.86 with higher reliability in shorter test-retest periods (average r = .72;  
Beck, Steer, Carbin, 1988). The BDI-II has excellent internal consistency with α ranging 
from 0.89 to 0.94 (Dozois & Covin, 2004). The BDI-II has shown excellent validity when 
used alongside other measures of depression, r’s = 0.68 to 0.93 ((Dozois & Covin, 2004; 




Chapter 3: Data Analysis 
Descriptive Analyses 
One-hundred and ten students presented to the laboratory and provided their 
informed consent for participation and completed the demographic questionnaires. Of 
these, 104 or 95% of the participants completed the self-report questionnaires. Due to a 
combination of non-completion of questionnaires and technical difficulties, data for 100 
or 90% of the participants could be used for the primary analysis with the emotional 
Stroop task and data for 103 or 92.7% of the participants could be used for the primary 
analysis with the dot-probe task. A set of preliminary analyses were conducted in order to 
examine the means, standard deviations, and skew of the data from the self-report 
questionnaires and the cognitive tasks.  
The threat bias scores for the emotional Stroop task were calculated by 
subtracting mean RTs of threatening stimuli from mean RTs of neutral stimuli. This 
procedure results in high positive scores indicating attention bias away from threat and 
negative scores indicating attention bias toward threat. All trials with reaction times 
above or below 2 standard deviations from the individual mean were excluded from 
further analyses. Similarly, trials with incorrect responses were also excluded; accuracy 
rates ranged from 82% - 96%. The data from the emotional Stroop task displayed 
problematic skewness and were consequently log transformed to produce skewness 
values within the normal range.  
The bias scores for the dot-probe task were calculated by subtracting mean RTs of 
threat congruent trials from mean RTs of threat incongruent trials. This procedure results 
in high positive scores indicating attention bias toward threat and negative scores 
24 
 
indicating attention bias away from threat. All trials with reaction times above or below 2 
standard deviations from the individual mean were excluded from further analyses. 
Similarly, trials with incorrect responses were also excluded; accuracy rates ranged from 
86% - 100%. The data from the dot-probe task were normally distributed.  
Primary Analyses: Moderation 
Baron and Kenny (1986) defined moderators as variables that influence the 
direction or strength of the relationship between a predictor and a criterion variable. 
Hayes (2013) describes moderation as a regression-based procedure that includes a 
predictor, a moderator, and their interaction term. The moderation model was estimated 
using PROCESS, which is a macro for SPSS that evaluates the statistical significance of 
the model and yielded the proportion of the variance in the reaction time differences 
attributable to the moderation of the effect of anxiety by IU. Mean centering is the 
process by which the sample mean of each variable is subtracted from each data point, 
resulting in a zero-centered distribution. Centering has been recommended as a necessary 
step in testing moderation due to the often high correlation between predictors and 
moderators resulting in multicollinearity and reduced power of the moderation test 
(Aiken  & West, 1991). Hayes (2013) has criticized this approach stating that analysis of 
both centered and uncentered data results in the same regression coefficients. However, 
Hayes (2013) also points out that data centering facilitates data interpretation, which is 
why we decided to center the data for the anxiety measure, the IU measure, and the 




Power analysis for the primary aim was conducted in order to determine the 
sample size that would ensure adequate power to detect a medium effect size. A 
moderation model is a regression model that includes predictor variables and their 
interaction term. Field (2013) lists several “rules of thumb” recommending between 10 
and 15 cases of data per predictor, which for the current study would translate into a 
sample size of 30. Green (1991) recommends a minimum acceptable sample size for 
testing a regression model of 50 + 8k, where k is the number of predictors, which for the 
current study would require 66 participants. Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009) and selecting linear multiple regression test with two predictors, an effect 
size f
2
 = 0.15, and power (1 – β) = 0.9, the minimum required sample size was 59. Our 





Chapter 4: Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Preliminary analyses were conducted in order to examine the means, standard 
deviations, and skew of the data from the self-report questionnaires and the cognitive 
tasks. The full sample counted 110 participants. Failure to complete questionnaires or the 
cognitive tasks resulted in largely overlapping samples, with 100 participants and 1 
participant unique to the sample used for the emotional Stroop task analyses, and 103 
participants and 5 of them unique to the sample used for the dot-probe task analyses. 
BAI, IUS, and BDI II displayed significant skewness and were consequently log 
transformed to produce skewness values within the normal range.  
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, Skew, and Kurtosis of Continuous Variables  
Variable Mean St. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
BAI
*
 8.98 8.59 1.489 1.714 
IUS
*
 63.16 17.45 .629 -.228 
PSWQ
*
 41.93 8.12 .179 -.216 
BDI-II
*
 10.26 7.72 1.011 1.66 




-6.702 71.814 -.034 .854 
Emotional Stroop Uncertain 
Stimuli† 
-22.719 81.384 .290 1.024 
Dot-Probe
‡
 -1.588 27.838 .273 .929 
*
N = 110; 
†
N = 100; 
‡
N = 103 
A set of preliminary analyses were conducted in order to determine if the reaction 
times in each cognitive task in the sample for this study differed significantly on a variety 
of demographic characteristics and stimulus characteristics. A series of one way 
ANOVA’s indicated that there were no significant differences on the performance on the 
emotional Stroop and the dot-probe tasks based on gender, age, ethnicity, and education 
(Table 3).  
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Gender F1, 102 = 0.35, p =.55 F1, 102 = 0.18, p =.67 F1, 104 = 0.30, p =.58 
Males  M = -.60, SD = 64.51 M = -27.36, SD = 74.22 M = -3.69, SD = 25.48 
Females M = -9.41, SD = 74.87 M = -20.33, SD = 85.29  M = -0.54, SD = 29.04 
Age F2, 101 = 1.02, p =.426 F8, 95 = 1.02, p =.42 F8, 97 = 0.55, p =.82 
18 M = -6.67, SD = 77.26 M = -23.35, SD = 81.48 M = -0.22, SD = 28.84 
19 M = -27.40, SD = 63.96 M = -37.4, SD = 67.51 M = .70, SD = 31.46 
≥20 M = 12.74, SD = 69.66 M = -8.26, SD = 92.32 M = -4.97, SD = 23.46 
Ethnicity F1, 102 = 0.18, p =.95 F4, 99 = 0.21, p =.93 F4, 101 = 0.63, p =.55 
Caucasian M = -9.03, SD = 75.22  M = -25.51, SD = 73.33 M = -1.94, SD = 27.63 
Other  M = -2.74, SD = 66.43 M = -17.96, SD = 94.42 M = -2.16, SD = 27.56 
Education F3, 100 = 0.31, p =.82 F3, 100 = 1.79, p =.15 F3, 102 = 1.94, p =.13 
Freshman M = -8.03, SD = 73.58 M = -30.12, SD = 74.65 M = 3.68, SD = 30.76 
Sophomore M = -10.27, SD = 85.27 M = 2.31, SD = 90.81 M = -4.47, SD = 24.40 
Junior M = 1.86, SD = 55.23 M = -51.30, SD = 75.94 M = -13.45, SD = 16.68 
Senior M = -0.72, SD = 42.51 M = -0.50, SD = 95.05 M = -8.66, SD = 26.53 
 
A series of univariate ANOVAs was conducted in order to investigate differences 
in the scores on BAI, IUS, PSWQ, and BDI-II across demographic characteristics. These 
analyses indicated significant differences in the scores of BAI based on gender, such that 
females [M(SD) = 10.33 (9.56)] scored significantly higher than males [M(SD) = 6.25 
(5.28)]. All other comparisons were not significant (Table 4).  
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Table 4. BAI, IUS, PSQW, and BDI-II Scores by Demographic Characteristics 
Demographic 
Variables 
BAI IUS PSWQ BDI-II 
Gender F1, 99 = 4.18, p =.04* F1, 105 = .03, p =.87 F1, 108 = 3.88, p =.05 F1, 106 = 2.31, p = .13 
Males  M = 6.38, SD = 5.35 M = 62.79, SD = 15.22 M = 40.05, SD = 8.17 M = 8.79, SD = 5.26 
Females M = 10, SD = 9.46 M = 62.57, SD = 18.16 M = 42.75, SD = 7.84 M = 10.03, SD = 8.71 
Age F8, 92 = 1.51, p =.16 F8, 98 = .58, p =.79 F8, 101 = .79, p =.55 F8, 99 = .85, p =.56 
18 M = 8.20, SD = 8.38 M = 65.17, SD = 19.45 M = 41.23, SD = 8.57 M = 10.67, SD = 6.85 
19 M = 8.15, SD = 7.72  M = 62.03, SD = 14.47  M = 41.06, SD = 7.32  M = 9.15, SD = 6.61 
≥20 M = 9.91, SD = 9.26 M = 62.34, SD = 18.86 M = 42.47, SD = 7.69 M = 9.13, SD = 7.26 
Ethnicity F4, 96 = .27, p =.89 F4, 102 = .44, p =.78 F4, 105 = .28, p =.89 F4, 103 = .47, p =.76 
Caucasian M = 8, SD = 7.93 M = 62.06, SD = 16.51 M = 42.38, SD = 7.30 M = 10.01, SD = 8.19 
Other  M = 10.08, SD = 9.22 M = 63.64, SD = 18.35 M = 40.91, SD = 9.14 M = 11.19, SD = 7 
Education F3, 97 = .86 p =.46 F3, 103 = .27, p =.85 F3, 106 = .61, p =.61 F3, 104 = .44, p =.72 
Freshman M = 9.01, SD = 9.36 M =63.6 , SD = 17.64 M = 41.9, SD = 8.55 M = 10.48, SD = 7.81 
Sophomore M = 7.58, SD = 6.68 M = 59.37, SD = 14.38 M = 40.33, SD = 7.34 M = 10.52, SD = 7.07 
Junior M = 9.3, SD = 7.89 M = 64.46, SD = 20.88 M = 43.38 , SD = 8.97 M = 10.3, SD = 8.47 
Senior M = 9.75, SD = 8.54 M = 63, SD = 16.62 M = 43.37, SD = 3.81 M = 10.25, SD = 7.06 
 
Correlation analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between 
measures of anxiety, IU, worry, and depression. As expected, all constructs were 
significantly correlated to each other (Table 6). The results indicate strong and positive 
relationships between each of the following: anxiety, IU, worry, and depression.  
Table 6. Pearson Bivariate Correlations Among Self-report Measures 
 BAI IUS PSWQ BDI-II 
BAI 1    
IUS .673* 1   
PSWQ .497* .496* 1  
BDI-II .605* .492* .621* 1 
*Statistically significant correlation (p < .01) 
Primary Analyses: Moderation Model 
A primary objective of this study was to evaluate the relationship between IU and 
information processing biases as indicates by reaction time differences in the emotional 
Stroop and dot-probe task. Regression analyses were conducted in order to investigate the 
effect of IUS, BAI, PSWQ, and BDI-II on reaction times in the two cognitive tasks, as 
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measured by the differences between performance in trials with neutral stimuli and 
performance in trials with stimuli conveying threat or uncertainty. The results did not 
yield any significant effects of IUS on reaction times in the cognitive tasks (Table 5).  
They also indicated that changes in levels of anxiety were not significantly associated 
with changes in reaction times in the two tasks with all three types of stimuli. Similarly, 
there was no significant association between changes in the levels of PSWQ and changes 
in reaction times in performance in the cognitive tasks. Scores on the BDI-II were not 
significantly associated with performance on the emotional Stroop and the dot-probe, as 
measured by reaction time differences. 
Table 5. Regression Analyses Testing the Effect of BAI, IUS, PSWQ, and BDI-II on 
Reaction Times  
Predictor Dependent Variable β
 
SE r p 
BAI Emotional Stroop Threatening 
Stimuli 
-2.138 8.369 .026 .799 
 Emotional Stroop Uncertain Stimuli -8.923 9.224 .101 .336 
 Dot Probe -2.824 3.16 .091 .374 
IUS Emotional Stroop Threatening 
Stimuli 
-44.156 26.695 .164 .101 
 Emotional Stroop Uncertain Stimuli -21.215 30.333 .070 .486 
 Dot Probe -13.129 10.076 .128 .195 
PSWQ Emotional Stroop Threatening 
Stimuli 
-.838 .874 .094 .340 
 Emotional Stroop Uncertain Stimuli -.172 .984 .017 .862 
 Dot Probe .016 .332 .005 .961 
BDI-II Emotional Stroop Threatening 
Stimuli 
-0.170 .888 .019 .842 
 Emotional Stroop Uncertain Stimuli -1.088 1.024 .105 .290 
 Dot Probe -.277 .363 .075 .447 
 
One of the primary objectives of this study was to evaluate the hypothesized role 
of IU as a moderator in the relationship between anxiety and attentional information 
processing biases as indicated in reaction time differences between neutral and emotional 
stimuli in three cognitive tasks: the emotional Stroop with threatening stimuli, the 
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emotional Stroop with uncertain stimuli, and the dot-probe with fearful stimuli. The 
analysis is based on the statistical interaction between the predictor and the moderator 
and their influence on the dependent variable. The SPSS PROCESS macro utilizes a 
regression model in which the effect of anxiety on attentional information processing 
biases is allowed to vary linearly with IU, by including the product of anxiety and IU as a 
predictor of processing biases along with anxiety and IU (Hayes, 2013). PROCESS also 
uses bootstrapping, which is a method that re-samples observations with replacement and 
tests the hypothesized model thousands of times by treating the sample as a 
representation of the targeted population. Following Hayes’ (2009) suggestion 
bootstrapping was set at 5000 resamples. Three sets of moderation analyses were 
conducted, using as the dependent variable (1) the reaction time outcome measure for the 
emotional Stroop using words denoting threat, (2) the emotional Stroop using words 
denoting uncertainty, and (3) the dot-probe task.  
Figure 1 represents the proposed moderation model with anxiety as the predictor, 




   
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized moderation model 
The main hypotheses were not supported given that the moderation models were 
not significant with each of the dependent variables: i.e. reaction time difference means 
for the emotional Stroop using words denoting threat, the emotional Stroop using words 
denoting uncertainty, and the dot-probe task. Specifically, the result of the moderation 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Uncertaintylerance 
Beck Anxiety Inventory Attentional Information 
Processing Biases  
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test indicated that IU did not moderate the relationship between anxiety and reaction 
times in emotional Stroop using words denoting threat (R = .241, R
2 = .
058, F3, 96 = 1.97, p 
= .122),. Similarly, IU did not moderate the relationship between anxiety and reaction 
times in the emotional Stroop using words denoting uncertainty (R = .158, R
2 = .
025, F3, 96 
= .822, p = .484). Also IU did not moderate the relationship between anxiety and reaction 




039, F3, 99 = 1.356, p = .260). Results from the 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) moderation analysis are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Contributions of IUS and BAI in Predicting Reaction Times 
Task Predictors β
 
SE t p 
Emotional  IUS -1.079 .491 -2.197 .030 
Stroop Threat BAI .511 .975 .524 .600 
Stimuli IUS x BAI .062 .039 .1.586 .116 
Emotional IUS .013 .566 .023 .981 
Stroop Uncertain BAI -.979 1.124 -.870 .386 
Stimuli IUS x BAI -.039 .0450 -.865 .389 
 IUS -.300 .189 -1.130 .116 
Dot-probe BAI .031 .378 .084 .933 
 IUS x BAI .023 .015 1.559 .122 
 
Despite non-significant models and interactions, PROCESS was used to generate 
the estimates of the dependent variables for various combinations anxiety and IU values. 
The predicting values for BAI and IUS included the mean, mean + S.D., and mean – S.D. 
The visual representations of the models are presented in Figure 2, 3, and 4. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Based on the results of the preliminary and primary analyses, information 
processing biases as evidenced reaction times in the emotional Stroop and dot-probe tasks 
were unrelated to anxiety, intolerance of uncertainty, and worry, as measured by BAI, 
IUS, and PSWQ. As such, it was not possible to investigate information processing biases 
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as evidenced by longer latencies in reaction time in the emotional Stroop and shorter 
latencies in reaction time in the dot-probe task.  
 
  
Figure 2. IUS Moderating BAI on Emotional Stroop Threatening Stimuli   
 



































































































Chapter 5: Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
This study was designed to investigate the role of IU as a moderator in the 
relationship between anxiety and automatic information processing biases. Contrary to 
expectations, IU was not a moderator in the relationship between anxiety and automatic 
information processing biases. Additionally, we found no evidence of a relationship 
between IU and reaction times in the emotional Stroop and dot-probe task. Unexpectedly, 
the current study did not demonstrate a relationship between anxiety and automatic 
information processing biases.     
IU, Anxiety, and Automatic Information Processing Biases 
The current study did not provide support for IU as a moderator in the relationship 
between anxiety and information processing biases. We had expected that heightened IU 
would strengthen the relationship between anxiety and information processing biases. 
This expectation was founded on extant research on the relationship between IU, anxiety 
globally, and specific features of anxiety. Specifically, IU was found to moderate the 
relationship between pathological worry and heart rate variability, indicating that IU 
affects physiological responses that are characteristic of anxiety and anxiety disorders 
(Ottaviani, Borlimi, Brighetti, et al, 2014). IU was also found to moderate the relationship 
between daily stress and worry, which is a central feature and symptom of anxiety 
(Zlomke & Jetter, 2014). Some studies found that IU mediates the relationship between 
negative affectivity and worry, as well as physical symptoms of anxiety (McEvoy & 
Mahoney, 2012). Thus, research to date has provided considerable support for the 
association of IU with worry and other factors that are crucial in the etiology and 
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maintenance of anxiety (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Koerner & Dugas, 2008). Clearly, IU 
needs to be recognized as a central actor in the development and maintenance of anxiety 
(Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003).  In light of past research, our findings are 
puzzling and highlight the need for a careful evaluation of the study design and potential 
limitations.  
Stemming from current theories of anxiety, we expected to see a strong 
significant relationship between anxiety and IU. Similarly, we expected IU to be 
correlated with worry and depression. We found significant strong correlations between 
each of the constructs. The strong correlation between IU and both anxiety and 
depression conforms with the view of IU as a transdiagnostic factor of internalizing 
disorders (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012).  It remains unclear if the correlation between IU 
and depression is due to the frequent co-occurrence between anxiety and depression or if 
IU is a mechanism underlying both disorders. Dugas, Schwartz, and Francis (2004) 
hypothesized that IU is a construct uniquely related to anxiety disorders more so than to 
depression, but the difference between those correlations was not statistically significant. 
In light of current findings and past research, it seems that IU has a significant strong 
relationship with both depression and anxiety, however the specific of these relationships 
need further exploration.     
The significant relationship between IU and anxiety has been shown to extend to 
other features of anxiety, such as worry, anxiety sensitivity, and elaborative cognitive 
processing (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011). Thus, we expected that the significant relationship 
between IU and anxiety would extend to automatic information processing biases. 
Attentional processing biases refer to cognitive functions that are instrumental in 
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establishing the order in which stimuli will be processed and the extent to which a 
stimulus will be processed. Thus, biased information processing is evident when an 
individual prioritizes for processing a certain category of stimuli over others, when he/she 
spends more time processing specific stimuli compared to other stimuli, and sometimes 
when he/she fails to eventually habituate to certain stimuli (Shechner, Britton, Perez-
Edgar, Bar-Haim, Ernst, Fox, Leibenluft, & Pine, 2012). There is evidence of a 
relationship between IU and better recall of material denoting uncertainty and threatening 
interpretation of uncertain situations (Davey et al., 1992; Koerner-Singh, 2008), which 
indicates biased information processing during the elaborative and interpretative stage. 
This study utilized cognitive tasks that target direction of attention to threatening 
characteristics of stimuli and attention disengagement during early automatic stages of 
information processing. We were unable to establish a relationship between IU and 
automatic information processing biases. This could mean that the association between 
IU and information processing biases is limited to the elaborative and interpretative 
processes and does not influence initial processing, to include attention orientation to and 
attention disengagement from stimuli denoting threat. 
In the current study, there was also a nonsignificant relationship between anxiety 
and automatic attentional processing biases. The failure to find a significant relationship 
between anxiety and information processing biases is particularly surprising, as this 
relationship has been confirmed in multiple studies and meta-analyses (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). A relationship between anxiety and attentional processing biases, in the lack of 
such relationship between IU and attentional processing biases would indicate that IU is 
not one of the mechanisms by which attention is oriented towards and maintained on 
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threatening stimuli. The failure to observe a significant association between information 
processing and both anxiety and IU makes it difficult to draw any conclusions specific to 
IU. It is possible that the lack of a relationship between IU and reaction times in cognitive 
tasks mirrors the lack of the relationship between anxiety and performance in the 
emotional Stroop and the dot-probe.  
The relationship between anxiety and attentional information processing biases is 
well-established (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). A more contentious issue is the presence of 
threat-related bias in low-anxiety or non-anxious individuals. Several studies have 
demonstrated the presence of threat-related biases in non-anxious individuals, while some 
have failed to do so. Thus it has been suggested that the relationship between anxiety and 
information processing biases is affected by either the range of anxiety in the participants 
or by the severity of threat conveyed by the stimuli. The participants in the current study 
displayed low scores of anxiety on the BAI averaging 8.98, which fall in the window of 
0-9 points and are characteristic of non-anxious samples (Antony & Orsillo, 2001; 
McDowell, 2006). The general low levels of anxiety and IU in our sample may explain 
the lack of an observable relationship between these scores and reaction times in the 
emotional Stroop and dot-probe tasks. At this point, it is important to note that other 
studies with similar samples, i.e. undergraduate students, and similar levels of anxiety, 
i.e. within the window of scores indicating healthy adults, have produced significant 
associations between anxiety and information processing biases as indicated by 
performance on the Stroop task (Egloff & Hock, 2003). It is possible that low anxiety 
scores led to small effect sizes, for which this study was underpowered to detect.      
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A similar picture emerges in the IU literature, where comparable levels of IU in a 
similar population were significantly associated with cognitive processes such as decision 
making (Luhman, Ishida, & Hajcak, 2011). The IUS scores in our sample were slightly 
higher than those previously found in non-anxious populations; unlike previous samples 
we noted a higher variability of scores. Hence, there is the possibility that a changing 
relationship between IU and reaction times at different points in the continuum of IU 
scores contributed to our inability to observe a statistically significant relationship 
between IU and processing biases. Ultimately, it may be that overall levels of IU are a 
poor predictor of automatic processing biases.  
The debate on the factor structure of IUS and other scales derived from IUS may 
provide further insight into our findings. Sexton and Dugas (2009) proposed two factors, 
namely Uncertainty Has Negative Behavioral and Self-Referent Implications and 
Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything, while Fergus (2013) divided the items into a 
behavioral and cognitive factor. Carleton et al. (2012) on the other hand examined the 
latent structure of IU and provided support for a continuous latent structure along a low-
high axis; they recommended that researchers strive for “comprehensive ranges of IU” in 
their samples.  
Some researchers have suggested that non-anxious individuals may show biases 
in information processing only when encountering highly threatening stimuli or 
prolonged exposure to threatening stimuli. Unfortunately, the current study used standard 
versions of the emotional Stroop and dot-probe tasks and did not utilize highly 
threatening stimuli nor prolonged exposure to such stimuli. In addition to the standard 
stimuli, we used stimuli denoting uncertainty. Consistent with this suggestion, stimuli 
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denoting uncertainty may be even less threatening and thus fail to elicit attentional biases 
in non-anxious individuals. Studies with non-clinical populations show small effect sizes 
and the findings are not consistent across studies. Ultimately, threat-related bias is 
strongest in clinically anxious samples, smaller in non-clinical but highly anxious 
samples, and very small in non-anxious samples. Consistent with these suggestions, 
either because of low anxiety in our sample or because of standard level of threat and 
duration of threat of the stimuli, we found no significant relationships between scores in 
anxiety, IU, and worry measures and reaction times to both stimuli denoting threat and 
uncertainty.  
We considered IU as a cognitive process aimed at processing stimuli denoting 
uncertainty and characterized by processing biases that become increasingly consuming 
for individuals with heightened IU.  We hypothesized that IU would influence not only 
interpretation of threatening material as more threatening than non-anxious people, but 
that uncertain material would connote danger and they would react to that material as if it 
were dangerous. This is in difference to the definition of IU that focuses on fear of 
possible danger (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; Dugas et al., 2005). The stimuli connoting 
uncertainty in the emotional Stroop included words associated with ambiguous outcomes. 
The stimuli connoting uncertainty in the dot-probe task included faces of a fearful 
expression, since it has been hypothesized that fear signifies a threat of uncertain source 
(Tottenham, Tanaka, Leon, McCarry, Nurse, Hare, Marcus, Westerlund, Casey,  Nelson, 
2010). Based on the findings from this study, we are unable to clarify whether a basic 
characteristic of IU is preoccupation with danger that may follow the uncertain or 
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whether uncertainty itself is associated with negative affectivity and arousal characteristic 
of anxiety.      
Limitations 
The present findings should be interpreted in the context of several limitations.  
First, the participants in the current study showed low levels of anxiety, worry, 
and IU. Participants in a previous study conducted with a similar population resulted in 
levels of anxiety, worry, and IU comparable to non-clinical samples. The low levels of 
anxiety may have contributed to a small effect size in the relationship between the 
predictors and dependent variables and this study was underpowered to detest an effect 
size of that magnitude. Alternatively, the time frame in which the data was collected may 
be an unexpected influential factor. The data for this study were collected during the first 
half of an academic semester, and there may be a time of semester by anxiety level 
correlation that we are unable to test or account for. Low anxiety scores are important as 
IU may relate differently to anxiety symptoms depending on the severity level of anxiety.  
Following procedures established in previous studies using the Stroop and dot-
probe tasks, the information processing bias scores were calculated by subtracting the 
reaction time for neutral stimuli from the mean reaction time for stimuli denoting threat 
or uncertainty. This method has been used widely in studies with cognitive, 
physiological, and neuropsychological assessments, despite suggested low reliability and 
problematic relation of the difference score to the baseline score (Salthouse & Hedden, 
2002).  Unfortunately, there are no clearly better alternatives. Related to the use of 
differences between mean reaction times is the loss of information of individual means 
and standard deviations in each condition.  
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Finally, the focal and moderating predictors were strongly and positively 
correlated. Such strong correlations are associated with inflation of variance in the 
dependent variable, which may have contributed to the current findings. 
Future Directions 
The present study is the first to investigate the role of IU as a moderator in the 
relationship between anxiety and automatic information processing biases and the 
relationship between IU and automatic information processing biases. Considering the 
limitations of this study, it is important to continue exploring these relationships in 
samples with a greater range of IU and anxiety scores. Another potential implication of 
the present study for research in the area of IU utilizing the emotional Stroop task is to 
select stimuli denoting general threat in addition to stimuli denoting uncertainty. Using a 
range of stimuli would serve to enhance our understanding of IU. 
In future research, it would be useful to revisit and further explore the 
conceptualization of IU. Current interpretations include a wide range of characterizations, 
yet we lack a defined theoretical structure of IU and its relationship with related 
phenomena. Definitions of IU as a dispositional characteristic, a personality trait, a 
cognitive process, and as a cognitive filter (Dugas and Robichaud, 2007; Dugas et al., 
2005; Fisher & Wells, 2009) have yet to specify if IU is a constituent of anxiety or an 
associated construct. Gentes and Ruscio (2011) theorized that IU is a feature shared by 
anxiety and mood disorders as evidenced by significant relationships between IU and 
GAD, OCD, and MDD. IU as a shared feature may explain the high comorbidity and 
common characteristics between anxiety and depression. Several studies have explored 
the relationship between IU and worry and have pointed to a strong correlation between 
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the two (Dugas et al, 2004). Fewer studies have included both worry and rumination in 
their investigation (de Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Liao & Wei, 2011). Worry and 
rumination are similarly characterized by repetitive thinking and negative affect. De 
Jong-Meyer et al (2009) suggested that it is the cognition and emotion based processes 
rather than the physical arousal symptoms that are more closely related to IU. Ultimately, 
a clear understanding of the construct of IU may provide a window to a better 
understanding of anxiety, anxiety symptoms, and other affective disorders.  
Future studies should test the possibility that IU is part of a more complex model 
and mediates or moderates the relationship between overall anxiety and different domains 
of symptoms of anxiety. The findings of this current study need to be considered with 
caution, given its limitations. Previous studies have investigated several models where IU 
is a mediator or a moderator of anxiety symptoms or where symptoms of anxiety 
moderate IU. A wealth of studies has found associations between IU and affective 
symptoms of anxiety, such as fear, negative affectivity, and low self-esteem (Carleton, 
Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010). Similarly, there is support for an association between 
IU and behavioral symptoms of anxiety, such as checking and repeating in obsessive-
compulsive disorders (Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003). The same goes for 
cognitive symptoms of anxiety, such as threatening interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, 
worry, and cognitive avoidance. Attentional processing biases are part of the cognitive 
system (Shechner et al., 2012). The possibility that IU is a moderator or a mediator in the 
relationship between anxiety and attentional information processing biases needs to be 
explored further.  
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Research on the factor structure of IU as measured by the IUS (Freeston et al, 
2004; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Norton, 2005; Carleton et al, 2007; Berenbaum et al, 2008; 
Sexton & Dugas, 2009) and on the relationship between IU, worry, and physiological 
activity (Ottaviani et al., 2014) seems to indicate that IU may be a qualitatively different 
construct in individuals with low versus high anxiety. Research on this topic is still far 
from conclusive, and little is known about the possible multidimensional structure of IU 
in highly anxious people and the cutoff levels of anxiety and IU in which this 
multidimensionality becomes apparent. In light of this possibility, future studies may 
need to take into account that IU may behave differently in its relationship with anxiety 
and anxiety symptoms, depending on the severity of anxiety. Additionally, the models of 
mediation and moderation may be different, depending on severity of anxiety. 
Specifically, IU may moderate the relationship between anxiety and attentional 
processing biases only in highly or clinically anxious people. If future research provides 
support for this hypothesis, further study is needed to establish the cutoff levels of 
anxiety, that are associated with possible changes in the factor structure and models of 
IU.     
A better understanding of IU and its relationship with anxiety and symptoms of 
anxiety would ultimately inform treatments targeting anxiety. Despite numerous 
treatments designed for individuals suffering from anxiety, worry, and IU, treatment 
efficacy for these cases still leaves room for improvement (Robichaud, 2013). Is there 
clinical utility in developing treatments that target IU specifically? Several studies 
suggest that IU may be a mediator and moderator of anxiety symptoms. If IU is the 
underlying driving mechanism of worry and anxiety, further research is needed to explore 
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its unique contribution to anxiety symptoms. In the end, clinical trials of treatments 
targeting IU can shed light on the value of such interventions, above and beyond existing 
treatments for anxiety and worry. 
Ultimately, continued investigation of IU can serve to elucidate the role it plays in 
the etiology and maintenance of anxiety. A better understanding of IU and anxiety can 
have important implications for tailoring interventions for those individuals experiencing 






Appendix A: Literature Review 
Anxiety is the predominant symptom in anxiety disorders, as classified and 
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000).  These disorders affect about 19 million adults in the 
United States every year (Grisel, Rasmussen, & Sperry, 2006). Feelings of anxiety may 
often be accompanied by unrelenting feelings of worry, apprehension, nervousness, fear, 
panic, obsessive thoughts, unwanted intrusive memories, nightmares, or repetitive 
ritualized behaviors. These feelings, thoughts, and behaviors are often characterized by 
dysregulation in muscle-tension or in sleep, respiratory, cardiovascular, or 
gastrointestinal systems. The list of anxiety disorders includes Panic Disorder and 
Agoraphobia, Social Anxiety Disorder, Specific Phobia, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.  
Anxiety and fear are both important, common elements found in all anxiety 
disorders. Anxiety has been described as an emotional state that is future-oriented, while 
fear has been described as an alarm reaction that is focused and inflexible (Antony, 
Orsillo, & Roemer, 2001). Intense anxiety and fear are often accompanied by more 
generally negative affect, a sense of unpredictability and uncontrollability, avoidance of 
feared situations/experiences, reliance on safety behaviors in order to reduce perceived 
threat, difficulty concentrating, and worry (Antony, Federici, & Stein, 2009; Antony, et 
al., 2001).  
Anxiety and Information Processing Biases 
Information processing bias is one of the factors that some theorists deem critical 
in the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 
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2009).  In fact, biased information processing is at the center of a number of current 
theoretical models of anxiety and anxiety disorders (Rapee, 2001; Mogg, & Bradley, 
1998; Mathews, & Mackintosh, 1998; Eysenck, 1992; Beck, & Clark, 1997; Clark, & 
Wells, 1995; Woody, & Rachman, 1994; Ohman, 1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988; Foa & Kozak, 1986).  Mathews & MacLeod (2005) note that biased 
information processing in people with anxiety is not narrow, deficient, incorrect, or 
distorted. It rather involves selective information processing that is negatively biased, 
resulting in higher-than-normal vigilance for threatening and other adverse stimuli 
(McNally & Reese, 2009).  In this view, information processing biases occur in all 
people, and these biases are driven by a person’s experiences and cognitions regarding 
the world and the self. In addition to the influence of normative human experiences on 
information processing, a great deal of attention has been focused on the influence of 
emotional and cognitive difficulties on this process. Research indicates that in anxious 
people information processing biases tends to reconfirm their view of the world as a 
dangerous place (Ouimet, Gawrinski, & Dozois, 2009). Information processing bias has 
been investigated during different stages of information processing—specifically during 
transformation of stimuli into subjective cognitive representations of these stimuli 
(encoding) (Amir, Coles, & Foa, 2002; MacLeod, 1991), during the process of assigning 
meaning and placing stimuli in a constellation of similar and related cognitive structures 
(interpretation) (Wilson, MacLeod, & Campbell, 2007; Amir, Coles, & Foa, 2002), and 
during the process by which subjective representations of stimuli that had been stored in 
memory are recalled or recognized (retrieval) (Mitte, 2008; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn, 2007). While most researchers agree, in part, 
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that anxiety is characterized by information processing biases (McNally & Reese, 2009); 
they disagree on the pattern and timeline in which such biases occur.  
Early cognitive theories of the etiology of anxiety proposed that anxiety is the 
result of enhanced automatic encoding of threatening stimuli, enhanced automatic 
retrieval of the same, enhanced automatic proliferation of anxiety schemata (Beck, 1976), 
and interpretation of uncertain stimuli as threatening (Bower, 1983). Although these 
theories propose different timelines and mechanisms of the automatic cognitive processes 
that enhance and maintain anxiety, they both predict facilitated processing of threatening 
stimuli. Some later theories proposed that the attention of anxious individuals is 
immediately captured by threatening stimuli and attentional resources are 
disproportionately allocated to processing these stimuli during the initial, automatic 
stages of processing (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Ohman, 1999). 
Other theories proposed that cognitive resources are disproportionately allocated towards 
threatening stimuli during later, elaborative, and interpretative processes (Mathews, & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997). Yet 
other theoretical models propose biased or selective processing in both initial automatic 
and later conscious stages of information processing. These models include preferential 
processing of threatening stimuli during initial, automatic stages of information 
processing (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992; Mogg et al, 
1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). The preferential automatic 
processing is followed by sustained selective semantic elaboration of threatening stimuli 
(Beck & Clark, 1997), threatening interpretation of uncertain stimuli (Eysenck, 1992), or 
avoidance resulting in failure to assess threat accurately and failure to habituate to 
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threatening stimuli (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 
1998; Mogg et al, 1997). 
The existing evidence for threat-related cognitive biases in anxiety disorders is the 
result of numerous experimental studies using various cognitive tests, many of which 
target attentional processes. In addition to the mere presence of attentional biases, these 
studies have explored other factors that affect the magnitude of information processing 
biases. These moderating factors include level of anxiety, specific anxiety disorders, 
comorbidity, stimulus awareness, specific cognitive task, and others  (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Krannnenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) 
conducted a meta-analysis investigating the magnitude, boundary conditions, and 
moderators of information processing biases in anxiety. They found a threat-related bias 
similar across diverse anxiety disorders and concluded that this bias, rather than being 
disorder specific, may be related to a possible mechanism that underlies both anxiety and 
anxiety disorders.  
Experimental Studies of Information Processing Biases 
Development and maintenance of anxiety disorders is the result of the strategies 
individuals apply in order to eliminate threatening stimuli and the strength if these stimuli 
(Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009). Many experimental paradigms have been 
developed in order to investigate processing biases in attention, memory, interpretation, 
judgment, and reasoning. Research on information processing biases has provided 
support for the existence of such biases in people with specific anxiety disorders (Mogg 
& Bradley, 2005; Clark & McManus, 2002; Heinrichs & Hofman, 2001; Buckley, 
Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; Musa & Lepine, 2000; McNally, 1999; Summerfeldt & Endler, 
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1998). A systematic quantitative review of this research provided evidence that threat-
related bias is a robust phenomenon, which differentiates non-anxious individuals from 
those with different types of anxiety across a variety of experimental conditions (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007).  
Experimental paradigms used to investigate information processing differ in how 
presence of anxiety affects task completion and in how information processing biases are 
operationalized. The presence of anxiety can either facilitate or disrupt performance on a 
task. Most paradigms entail tasks performed in the presence and/or absence of 
threatening stimuli. In some paradigms the presence of threatening stimuli disrupts or 
interferes with task completion. In other paradigms the presence of threatening stimuli 
increases ease of completing the task in the presence of anxiety. The combined results of 
these types of experiments provide strong support for the presence of information 
processing biases in anxiety disorders.   
The most notable examples of these experimental paradigms include the 
emotional Stroop, dot-probe, emotional spatial cuing, and visual search paradigms (Bar-
Heim et al, 2007). These paradigms have been crucial in investigating biases in attention 
and specific aspects of attention such as attention allocation, automaticity, or timeline of 
attention allocation and withdrawal (Shalev & Algom, 2000). Information processing 
biases in these paradigms are operationalized as the difference in the time it takes an 
individual to react to threatening stimuli versus time to react to neutral or positive stimuli. 
Experiments using these paradigms allow for making conclusions with regards to 
information processing biases in general, and specifically with regards to 
disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources in verbal-linguistic processing of 
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threatening stimuli (emotional Stroop), engaged attention or inability to disengage 
attention with threatening stimuli (dot-probe task), engaged attention with threatening 
stimuli (spatial cuing), and enhanced attentional capture of threatening stimuli (emotional 
visual search). These experiments do not allow for making conclusions with regards to 
the disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources during the non-verbal processing of 
threatening stimuli.   
The emotional Stroop and dot-probe tasks have often been used to investigate 
information processing biases during attention orientation and engagement (Ouimet, 
Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009). 
Emotional Stroop. The classic Stroop task was designed to investigate the 
interference of names of colors with the color of the ink used to print the words or the 
interference of the semantic characteristics of the word with the physical characteristics 
of the print (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop paradigm was designed to investigate how 
preexisting associations inhibit or interfere with processing certain aspects of presented 
stimuli (Stroop, 1935). Specifically, Stroop (1935) wanted to find “why it takes more 
time to name colors than to read color names (pp. 645).” The innovation of the paradigm 
designed by Stroop rested on the fact that the two conflicting or interfering stimuli were 
different aspects of the same symbol. The symbols were words (i.e. names of colors) or 
non-words (i.e. series of squares or X-s) printed in different colors. The two interfering 
stimuli that were inherent aspects of these words were (1) the color of the print and (2) 
the status as a word or non-word. 100 symbols (words or non-words) were printed on a 
card and arranged in a square (10 words across and 10 words down). The participants 
were asked to read or name colors as quickly as possible and correct all errors they may 
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have made. One of the first studies described by Stroop compared the time that it took for 
the participants to read names of colors printed in black and names of colors printed in 
colors different than the one named by the word. Another study compared the time that it 
took to name the color of the print of groups of solid squares or swastikas (although 
published three months after the Hitler introduced the new German flag with the 
swastika, the studies were conducted months prior to that event) to the time it took to 
name the color of the print when the word spelled the name of a different color. Stroop’s 
studies investigated the association between the word stimuli and the reading response 
compared to the association between the color stimuli and the naming response. He 
concluded that the association between the word stimulus and the reading response is 
stronger and it inhibits or interferes with other weaker associations, i.e. between the color 
stimuli and naming response. The time difference between naming the color of words and 
non-words is an indicator of the conflict introduced by the word stimuli.  
Stroop’s studies established that some cognitive processes are more equal than 
others; however, identifying the specific characteristics of these processes and their 
timeline has proven more challenging. Research inspired by Stroop’s studies has focused 
on establishing which cognitive processes take priority and consume more cognitive 
resources, and how individual or stimulus differences affect these priorities. Since its 
creation, the Stroop Color-Word Test has inspired many variations from its basic form 
which was designed to tap “into the primitive operations of cognition (pp. 163)” 
(MacLeod, 1991). Klein (1964) expanded on Stroop’s study by introducing word 
meaning as another aspect that can interfere with processing and reacting to the color of 
the print. Klein included names of colors used as color stimuli, names of colors not used 
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as color stimuli, common words, rare words, and non-words. He found that interference 
with performance on the Stroop task, increased with the meaningfulness of the word. The 
meaning of a word can be more accessible because of greater practice with the word or 
because of greater relevance.  
The terms Modified Stroop or Emotional Stroop refer to a task similar to the 
original Stroop, where the names of colors have been replaced with words that are 
hypothesized to have emotional significance for the participants that will complete the 
task. Following Klein’s example, researchers have created multiple versions of the Stroop 
Test by altering the meaning of the words from names of colors to words with special 
significance to the population of interest: sad words for participants with depression 
(Mitterschifthaler, Williams, Walsh, Cleare, Donaldson, Scott, & Fu, 2008; McNeely, 
Lau, Christensen, & Alain, 2008), anxiety provoking words for participants with phobias 
(Andersson, Westoo, Johansson, & Carlbring, 2006; Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 
2001), or trauma related words for participants with PTSD (Bremner, Vermetten, 
Vythilingam, Afzal, Schmahl, Elzinga, & Charney, 2004; Paunovic, Lundh, & Ost, 2002; 
McNally, 1998). Numerous studies indicate that participants take longer to name the 
color ink of words compared to the meaningless string of symbols. Phaf & Kan (2006) 
explained that the delay in naming the ink color is the result of simultaneous automatic 
processing of the semantic meaning of the word which is absent in the case of 
meaningless strings of symbols. Generally, the goal of the task was to determine how a 
stimulus characteristic affects the processing of another characteristic of the same 
stimulus. In the emotional Stroop task the participants are asked to name the color of the 
ink for words that have emotionally neutral or emotionally relevant meaning. Numerous 
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studies have indicated that people with emotional difficulties take longer to name the 
color of emotional words compared to neutral words, while people in control groups do 
not show such effect (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The hypotheses of these 
studies state that the disorder-specific content of the words will interfere with the 
cognitive processes of the participants who suffer from that disorder and they will take 
longer to name their color compared to naming the color of neutral or irrelevant words. 
Reviews of such studies reveal that the emotional Stroop interference has been observed 
in a variety of clinical conditions (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). 
The emotional Stroop task has been widely used to investigate information 
processing biases in relation to anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) 
conducted a thorough meta-analytic review of studies investigating threat-related 
attentional biases using the emotional Stroop task in 1467 individuals. The researchers 
found a significant threat-related bias in adults and children with high anxiety or anxiety 
disorders. Similar findings have been observed in individuals with specific anxiety 
disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder (Cisler, Wolitzky-Taylor, Adams, Babson, 
Badour, & Willems), generalized anxiety disorder (Mogg & Bradley, 2005), specific 
phobias, social phobia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Tobon, Ouimet, & Dozois, 
2011). Longer reaction times with anxiety provoking material in the emotional Stroop 
task have also been associated with key cross-anxiety disorder cognitive constructs such 
as worry (Oathes, Siegle, Ray, 2011) and anxiety sensitivity (Taake, Jaspers-Fayer, & 
Liotti, 2009).  
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This bias has been explained as the result of attention being automatically directed 
towards the emotional characteristics of the word processed simultaneously with naming 
the color of the print (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). 
Dot Probe. The dot-probe task was designed to investigate attention biases 
towards threatening material (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In the dot-probe task 
the participants are presented simultaneously with a threatening and a nonthreatening 
stimulus. After a brief presentation, the stimuli are removed and one of them is replaced 
with a probe. The participants are asked to respond to the probe as quickly and accurately 
as possible. It is assumed that the participants will react faster to the probe that replaced 
the stimulus to which they were attending at the onset of the probe. Numerous studies 
have indicated that people with emotional difficulties are faster at reacting to the probe 
when it replaces the threatening stimulus rather than when it replaces the neutral stimulus 
(Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009). The dot-probe task has been used in many studies 
aiming to investigate selective attention biases in people with anxiety (Frewen, Dozois, 
Joanisse, & Neufeld, 2008). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) reviewed 35 studies including 659 
individuals that used the dot-probe paradigm. The researchers found that the dot probe 
paradigm was effective in detecting the differences between anxious and non-anxious 
individuals. McKay, Thoma, and Pilecki (2009) explained that the observed bias in the 
dot-probe task is the result of enhanced attention towards threatening stimuli or lower 
threshold for detecting threat. Shorter reaction times when the probe replaces anxiety 
provoking or threatening material have been observed in individuals with specific anxiety 
disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder (Wald, Shechner, Bitton, Holoshitz, Charney, 
Muller, Fox, Pine, & Bar-Haim, 2011), generalized anxiety disorder (Bradley, Mogg, 
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White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999), specific phobias (Wenzel & Holt, 1999), social phobia 
(Stevens, Rist, & Gerlach, 2011), and possibly obsessive-compulsive disorder (Amir, 
Najmi, & Morrison, 2009). Attention biases towards anxiety-provoking material in the 
dot-probe task have also been associated with key cross-anxiety disorder cognitive 
constructs such as worry (McKay, 2005) and anxiety sensitivity (Hunt, Keogh, & French, 
2006). 
Bar-Heim et al (2007) found that the emotional Stroop task and the dot-probe task 
yielded effect sizes that were statistically similar across anxiety disorders. Emotional 
Stroop and dot-probe tasks have been used with general threatening stimuli and 
threatening stimuli that are specific to certain anxiety disorders (i.e., generalized anxiety 
disorder, social or specific phobias, panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and 
posttraumatic stress disorder). These studies have observed bias for both general threat 
information and for information that is consistent with the specific concerns and 
diagnosed anxiety disorder of the participant indicating an underlying non-specific 
anxiety component common for all anxiety disorders (McKay, Thoma, & Pilecki, 2009). 
The correlation between results obtained with the emotional Stroop and dot-probe 
paradigms in both subliminal and supraliminal versions indicate that these tasks target 
similar constructs (Egloff & Hock, 2003).   
The stimuli used in the dot-probe task include both verbal and non-verbal 
material. Photographs of faces are often used as non-verbal stimuli in the dot-probe task. 
The presentation of a human face is a powerful stimulus that initiates immediate 
cognitive processing (Wiese, Schweinberger, & Neuman, 2008). Within fractions of a 
second we perceive enough information from a presented face so as to make judgments 
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on someone’s gender, race and age (Bruce, & Young, 1998). One of the vital 
characteristics of a face is the emotion of the face (Wiese, Schweinberger, Neuman, 
2008). Emotionality is a characteristic that often results in a lasting and salient memory 
of that stimulus (Parrot & Spackman, 2000). Emotional expressions are one of the factors 
that have been investigated in the framework of repetition priming, in the attempt to 
better understand the impact of emotions on perception (Burton, Rabin, Wyatt, Frohlich, 
Vardy, & Dimitri, 2005; Bentley, Vuilleumier, Thiel, Driver, & Dolan, 2003; 
Campanella, Quinet, Bruyer, Crommelinck,  & Guerit, 2002). Research to date indicates 
that the introduction of an emotional dimension leads to changes in the repetition priming 
effect; however, the findings are mixed and difficult to integrate (Burton et al., 2005; 
Bentley et al., 2003). This study will investigate the repetition priming effect for 
photographs of faces displaying happy or fearful expressions. The advantage of using 
photographs of emotional faces is that it requires minimal verbal-linguistic processing; 
hence, it focuses the search for processing biases in the time window following the 
attention capture and preceding the verbal processing of threatening stimuli or 
disengagement from stimuli.  
Anxiety and Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Theoretical models of anxiety disorders include cognitive constructs that are 
believed to play a crucial role in the etiology and maintenance of these disorders. Some 
of these cognitive constructs are thought to be specific to certain anxiety disorders, such 
as fear of negative evaluation being specific to social anxiety disorder (Starcevic & Berle, 
2006) or fragmentation of memory being specific to posttraumatic stress disorder 
(Zoellner & Bittenger, 2004). Other cognitive constructs are thought to be common 
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across diagnoses, such as worry being associated with several anxiety disorders and 
depression (Gordon & Heimberg, 2011).    
Worry was first defined as an uncontrollable chain of thoughts charged with 
negative affect (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). This chain of thoughts 
aims to solve problems with uncertain outcomes, especially when some of these 
outcomes may be negative. Worry has also been defined as an anticipatory cognitive 
process that is characterized by the tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli as 
threatening, the tendency to predict negative outcomes for uncertain events, and the 
tendency to overestimate risk (Ladouseur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). Worry has further 
been defined as fear-producing thoughts and images related to everyday-life experiences 
that have the potential to result in adverse consequences (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; 
Taylor, Thordarson, Sochting, 2002). These thoughts and images are thought to be 
uncontrollable, excessive, repetitive, and to remain unresolved in the absence of 
intervention (Mathews, & Funke, 2006).  
According to cognitive theories of anxiety, worry is related to threat schemata in 
an individual’s long-term memory (Mathews, & Funke, 2006). When these threat 
schemata are activated, they may increase vigilance for internal or external threats (e.g. 
negative evaluation or harm, respectively). The preferential processing of threatening 
stimuli, also known as biased information processing, can have causal effects on the 
etiology and maintenance of anxiety and worry (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). The 
variables that have been proposed as predictors of excessive worry are: intolerance of 
uncertainty, beliefs that worry has a protective function, negative orientation towards 
problem situations, and cognitive avoidance (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 
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1998). The relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and worry remains strong 
even after taking into account anxiety and depression (Buhr, & Dugas, 2006; Buhr & 
Dugas, 2009; Boelen, Vrinssen, & van Tulder, 2010; de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2007; de 
Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2006; Dugas, Gosselin, Ladouceur, 2001).  
Based on the proposed models of the relationship between intolerance of 
uncertainty and worry, intolerance of uncertainty can be conceptualized as both a 
mediator and a moderator in the relationship between worry and anxiety symptoms 
(Newman & Llera, 2011).  In its mediating role, intolerance of uncertainty has been 
conceptualized as the underlying mechanism or the core schema by which ambiguous and 
uncertain situations are considered dangerous and result in worry (van der Heiden, 
Melchoir, Muris, Bouwmeester, Bos, & van der Molen, 2010). In its moderating role, 
intolerance of uncertainty has been conceptualized as the factor that enhances worry by 
enhancing the beliefs that worry has a protective function, negative orientation towards 
problem situations, and cognitive avoidance (Luhmann, Ishida, & Hajcak, 2011).  
Theoretical Conceptualizations of Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Intolerance of uncertainty has been defined as biased perception, interpretation, or 
negative emotional/cognitive/behavioral response to uncertain situations and events 
(Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Dugas, Hedayati, Karavidas, Buhr, Francis, & Philips, 2005; 
Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004). Intolerance of uncertainty has been conceptualized as 
a dispositional characteristic, a personality trait, a cognitive process, and a cognitive filter 
(Dugas and Robichaud, 2007; Dugas et al., 2005; Fisher & Wells, 2009). Behavioral 
operationalizations of intolerance of uncertainty include attempts to control the future, 
all-or-nothing responses in cases of uncertainty (Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010), 
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heightened information-seeking (Starcevic & Berle, 2006), and difficulties with decision-
making (Krain, Hefton, Pine et al., 2006). 
People with high intolerance of uncertainty perceive uncertain events as stressful 
and upsetting. They further interpret such events as negative, threatening, and unfair, and 
they avoid or are unable to act in uncertain situations.  In addition, they are unable to 
tolerate the possibility of a negative outcome, even if the probability of such outcome is 
very small (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; Dugas et al., 2005). It has been suggested that 
intolerance of uncertainty results in selective encoding and interpretation of information, 
such that people with high intolerance pay more attention to uncertain stimuli, go through 
greater elaborative encoding of uncertain information, have enhanced recollection of 
uncertain stimuli, and have greater tendency to interpret such stimuli as threatening 
(Dugas et al., 2005). Researchers suggest that preferential encoding of threatening 
information, threatening interpretation of uncertain stimuli, and preferential retrieval of 
threatening information results in extreme concern and worry when any physical or 
psychological peril is present (Koerner, 2008).  
Research investigating the influence of anxiety and of intolerance of uncertainty 
on information processing has indicated that intolerance of uncertainty is a unique 
contributor that defines the experience of anxiety beyond anxiety symptoms. Intolerance 
of uncertainty has been conceptualized both as a cognitive vulnerability and as a 
characteristic of anxiety; it is part of a vicious circle where its presence influences worry 
which in turn interferes with information processing of uncertain stimuli, which then 
maintains and enhances anxiety symptoms (Koerner and Dugas, 2008).  
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Several factor analyses have attempted to identify the factor structure of 
intolerance of uncertainty and have yielded inconsistent conclusions with regards to the 
number of factors, ranging from 2 to 5, and the ideas reflected in the factors (Freeston et 
al, 2004; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Norton, 2005; Carleton et al, 2007; Berenbaum et al, 
2008; Sexton & Dugas, 2009). Factors that have been identified by these studies include: 
the belief that uncertainty has negative repercussions, and the belief that uncertainty is 
damaging and unfair (Sexton & Dugas, 2009; Buhr & Dugas, 2002); need of 
predictability, inaction in the face of uncertainty, experiencing uncertainty as distressing, 
and inflexible beliefs about uncertainty (Berenbaum et al, 2008; Buhr & Dugas, 2002); 
anxiety, and avoidance (Carleton et al, 2007).  McEvoy and Mahoney (2011) suggested 
that these inconsistencies may be due to diversity in the severity of anxiety and 
intolerance of uncertainty experienced by participants across studies.  Some of these 
studies employed participants with non-clinical levels of anxiety and intolerance which 
may have led to more homogenous answers, while others employed participants with 
clinical levels of anxiety which may have led to answers revealing a multidimensional 
structure of intolerance of uncertainty.  
Intolerance of uncertainty was initially conceptualized as a construct strongly 
related with worry and generalized anxiety disorder (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000). Recent 
research indicates that intolerance of uncertainty may be a construct that defines the 
experience of anxiety and is not necessarily restricted to a specific generalized anxiety 
disorder diagnoses (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). For example, recent studies have 
identified a relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (Lind & Boschen, 2009), social anxiety (Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 
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2010), panic disorder with agoraphobia (Buhr & Dugas, 2009), and even depression (de 
Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009). In addition, intolerance of uncertainty is correlated to 
other anxiety constructs that play an important role in the etiology and maintenance of 
different anxiety disorders, such as worry (de Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009), anxiety 
sensitivity (Carleton, Sharpe, Asmundson, 2007), and fear of anxiety. Recent studies 
indicate that enhancing negative interpretive biases increases vulnerability to stress 
(White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011) in both children (Eldar, Ricon, & Bar-
Haim, 2008) and adults (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). 
Chen and Hong (2010) investigated the role of intolerance of uncertainty in heightening 
anxiety levels in the presence of situations. The researchers found that intolerance of 
uncertainty moderated the role of daily stress on the experience of anxiety. They 
suggested that the heightened levels of anxiety were the result of increased perceived 
threat as uncertain elements of the situations are perceived as threatening.   
Information Processing Biases in Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Research on information processing biases and worry or intolerance of 
uncertainty has provided support for biased recall of stimuli denoting uncertainty (Dugas 
et al., 2005), threatening interpretation of ambiguous statements (Dugas et al., 2005), 
indecisiveness and hypersensitivity regarding threat (Rassin & Muris, 2005), and concern 
and threatening appraisal regarding ambiguous situations (Keorner & Dugas, 2008). 
Studies investigating processing biases in worry and intolerance of uncertainty have used 
verbal-linguistic stimuli and have assessed biases during the interpretative and 
elaborative phase of information processing. Dugas et al. (2005) reasoned that words are 
the ideal medium for investigating biases in information processing in worriers and 
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people with high intolerance of uncertainty, because verbal-linguistic processes 
predominate in worry.  
Experimental Studies of Information Processing Biases in Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Dugas et al. (2005) were among the first to investigate information processing 
biases in relation to intolerance of uncertainty after noting a lack of research on the topic. 
The goal of their work was to identify how intolerance of uncertainty information 
processing and how that in turn led to excessive worry and anxiety. The authors focused 
on biases in recall of material denoting uncertainty, and biases in interpretation of 
uncertain situations; they found that intolerance of uncertainty led to better recall of 
material denoting uncertainty and threatening interpretation of uncertain situations. The 
materials used in these experiments included a word list including 30 words (15 of which 
were ambiguous), and the Ambiguous/Unambiguous Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey et 
al., 1992) consisting of 28 fictitious diary entries (14 of which were ambiguous). These 
findings were replicated by Koerner-Singh (2008), who, in addition, investigated the 
effect of intolerance of uncertainty on using anxious affect in processing uncertain 
material using both vignettes and pictorial stimuli.  The materials used in these 
experiments included 17 fictitious diary entries from AUSD with an additional 38 
original vignettes, the Emotional Reasoning Task (Engelhard et al., 2002) consisting of 
scenarios capturing a wide variety of threatening situations, and photographs of varied 
levels of pleasantness. Existing research indicates people high in intolerance of 




Grupe & Nitschke (2011) presented their participants with aversive and neutral 
pictures. Each picture was preceded by a cue indicating varying degrees of certainty that 
an aversive picture would follow, however the participants were not explicitly informed 
of the meaning of each cue. Throughout this task, as the participants were presented with 
each cue they recorded the level of expectancy that the image following that cue would 
be aversive. The participants also recorded their level of certainty that their judgment 
about the valence of the following image was correct. The self-report data was also 
accompanied by measurement of the participants’ skin conductance. Through the self 
monitoring procedures and skin conductance measurements, the participants showed 
higher than chance expectancy that cues denoting uncertainty were followed by an 
aversive image. The authors concluded that there is a relationship between uncertainty 
and threatening interpretation of uncertain cues and situations.    
Ritter (2007) aimed to identify a measurable behavioral manifestation of 
intolerance of uncertainty. The participants completed a task in which they were 
presented simultaneously with two gambles with differing levels of probability to win. 
They were asked to choose the gamble that would result in the best chance to win. The 
participants with higher self-reported levels of worry and intolerance of uncertainty 
consistently chose the gamble with full probability disclosure that was associated with the 
lowest level of uncertainty. The author concluded that high levels of intolerance of 
uncertainty are associated with consistent avoidance of ambiguity, while recognizing that 
such behavior could also be influenced by worry, state anxiety, and depression.  
Intolerance of uncertainty has also been investigated as a crucial cognitive feature 
of obsessive compulsive disorder (Gangerni, Baldini, Carini, Cieri, Ciocci, Cioce, Ercoli, 
64 
 
Frellicca, Frenza, Masi, Pozzolo, Reale, & Mancini, 2003). Gangerni et al. (2003) 
investigated the influence of intolerance of uncertainty in combination with fear of guilt. 
Both intolerance of uncertainty and fear of guilt are related to risk taking behaviors. The 
authors proposed that people with high intolerance of uncertainty direct their efforts at 
avoiding punishment or aversive experiences, thus they exhibit less risk taking behaviors.  
Johanson (1999) investigated the relationship between risk aversion and three 
possible contributing constructs, one of which was intolerance of uncertainty. Varying 
versions of a gambling task targeted uncertainty avoidance, regret avoidance, and self-
image protection as possible explanations for people’s choices in the tasks. The results of 
the study indicated that intolerance of ambiguity was negatively correlated with risky 
choices.  
Current experimental studies of intolerance of uncertainty have targeted 
interpretational processing biases and identification of behavioral markers of this 
construct. Research to date provides support for the hypothesis that intolerance of 
uncertainty is a construct that affects thought processes and results in observable 
behavioral manifestations.     
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Depression  
The relationship between IU and anxiety symptoms is well documented (Gentes 
& Ruscio, 2011). Anxiety, in turn, often co-occurs with depression, with comorbidity 
rates ranging from 15%-73% (Kaufman & Charney, 2000). Numerous studies have 
investigated underlying mechanisms, cognitive processes, and dimensional traits shared 
by anxiety and depression in the attempt to explain this comorbidity and develop better 
treatments (Querstret & Cropley, 2013; Bauer, Wilansky-Traynor, & Rector, 2012). 
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Yook et al. (2010) theorized that individuals with high IU may experience negative affect 
and low self-esteem due to their bleak outlook for the future and worry that they do not 
possess sufficient problem solving skills to manage this uncertain future. Anticipation of 
negative events is a feature associated with IU, anxiety, and depression. When faced with 
an uncertain future, individuals with anxiety engage in repetitive cognitions, also known 
as worry, focused on solving and preparing for the unknown problem waiting for them in 
the unknown future (Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013). 
Individuals with depression predict negative outcomes and use a very similar coping 
mechanism, repetitive cognitions focused on negative emotions, known as ruminations 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Yook et al., 2010). Recent studies indicate that IU may be an 
important and shared factor in the etiology, maintenance, and treatment of emotional 
disorders (Boswell et al., 2013).  High comorbidity indicates that depression is a correlate 
that may influence information processing biases. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Need for Closure 
Intolerance of uncertainty is comparable to need for closure - a construct that was 
developed and has been widely used in social psychology studies (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996). Similarly to intolerance of uncertainty, need for closure has been conceptualized 
as the drive to find definite answers and to avoid ambiguity. Need for closure has not 
been studied in association with information processing biases, as defined and 
operationalized in cognitive and clinical psychology studies. However, need for closure 
has been investigated in relation to impression formation and stereotyping, which are 
processes reliant on information processing (Dijksterhuis, Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & 
Schaper, 1996; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991).  An 
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investigation of the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and need for closure 
indicated statistical significant correlations between the subscales of the two scales 
(Berenbaum, Bredemeier, & Thompson, 2007). 
Colbert, Peters & Garety (2005) investigated the effect of anxiety and need for 
closure on psychotic symptoms. The participants that met criteria for generalized anxiety 
disorder and those that had psychotic symptoms scored higher on the need for closure 
scale. Also, severity of state anxiety was positively correlated to the severity of need for 
closure. This positive correlation points to additional similarities between need for 
closure and intolerance of uncertainty.  
Cognitive processing characteristics associated with need for closure have been 
investigated in the framework of consumer information processing and sale strategies 
(Choi, Koo, Choi, & Auh, 2008). High levels of need for closure were found to be 
associated with focus on attributes of products rather than considering alternatives and 




Appendix B: Dot-probe task Photographs and Emotional Stroop 
Word List 
Photographs of a Face with a Fearful and Happy Expression Used in the Dot-Probe Task 
Fearful Expression Happy Expression 
  




Emotional Stroop Task Word List 
Threatening Words Words Denoting Uncertainty Matched Neutral Words 
Furious  Inconclusive Identifiable 
Helpless Possibility Personality 
Punishment Uncertain Unofficial 
Vicious Unsure Uniform 




Appendix C: Instruments 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Please indicate your responses to the following questions, by checking the space before 

















_____1. African/African American 
_____2. Asian/Asian American 
_____3. Caucasian/European American 
_____4. Hispanic/Hispanic American 
_____5. Native American 










 Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
You will find below a series of statements which describe how people may react to the 
uncertainties of life. Please use the scale below to describe to which extent each item is 
























_____1. Uncertainty stops me from having a firm opinion. 
_____2. Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized. 
_____3. Uncertainty makes life intolerable. 
_____4. It’s not fair that there are no guaranties in life. 
_____5. My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will happen tomorrow. 
_____6. Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed. 
_____7. Unforeseen events upset me greatly. 
_____8. It frustrates me not having all the information I need. 
_____9. Being uncertain allows me to foresee the consequences beforehand and to 
prepare for them. 
_____10.  One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises. 
_____11. A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the best of planning. 
_____12. When it’s time to act uncertainly it paralyses me. 
_____13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate. 
_____14. When I am uncertain I can’t go forward. 
_____15. When I am uncertain I can’t function very well. 
_____16. Unlike me, others always seem to know where they are going with their lives. 
_____17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad. 
_____18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me. 
_____19. I hate being taken by surprise. 
_____20. The smallest doubt stops me from acting. 
_____21. I should be able to organize everything in advance. 
_____22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence. 
_____23. I think it’s unfair that other people seem sure about their future. 
_____24. Uncertainty stops me from sleeping well. 
_____25. I must get away from uncertain situations. 
_____26. The ambiguities in life stress me. 
_____27. I can’t stand being undecided about my future. 
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Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
Enter the number that best describes how typical or characteristic each item is of you, 
putting the number next to the item. 
 
1 













_____1. If I don’t have enough time to do everything, I don’t worry about it. 
_____2. My worries overwhelm me. 
_____3. I do not tend to worry about things. 
_____4. Many situations make me worry. 
_____5. I know I shouldn’t worry about things, but I just cannot help it. 
_____6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot. 
_____7. I’m always worrying about something. 
_____8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 
_____9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything else I have to do. 
_____10. I never worry about anything. 
_____11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I don’t worry about it 
anymore. 
_____12. I’ve been a worrier all my life. 
_____13. I notice that I have been worrying about things. 
_____14. Once I start worrying, I can’t stop. 
_____15. I worry all the time. 






Beck Anxiety Inventory  
 
Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety.   Please carefully read each item in the 
list.  Indicate how much you have been bothered by that symptom during the PAST 
WEEK, including today, by circling the number in the corresponding space in the 
column next to each symptom. 
 
 Not At All Mildly but it 
didn’t bother me 
much.  
Moderately - it 
wasn’t pleasant at 
times 
Severely – it 
bothered me a lot 
Numbness or tingling 0 1 2 3 
Feeling hot 0 1 2 3 
Wobbliness in legs 0 1 2 3 
Unable to relax 0 1 2 3 
Fear of worst 
happening 
0 1 2 3 
Dizzy or lightheaded 0 1 2 3 
Heart pounding/racing 0 1 2 3 
Unsteady 0 1 2 3 
Terrified or afraid 0 1 2 3 
Nervous 0 1 2 3 
Feeling of choking 0 1 2 3 
Hands trembling 0 1 2 3 
Shaky / unsteady 0 1 2 3 
Fear of losing control 0 1 2 3 
Difficulty in breathing 0 1 2 3 
Fear of dying 0 1 2 3 
Scared 0 1 2 3 
Indigestion 0 1 2 3 
Faint / lightheaded 0 1 2 3 
Face flushed 0 1 2 3 





Beck Depression Inventory – II   
Instructions:  This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements.  Please read each 
group of statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that best 
describes the way you have been feeling this past week.  Circle the number beside the 
statement you have picked.  If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, 
circle the highest number for that group.  Be sure that you do not choose more than 
one statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or 
Item 18 (Changes in Appetite). 
 
1) Sadness 
0. I do not feel sad. 
1. I feel sad much of the time. 
2. I am sad all the time.   
3. I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
 
2) Pessimism 
0. I am not discouraged about my future. 
1. I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be. 
2. I do not expect things to work out for me.  
3. I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
 
3) Past Failure 
0. I do not feel like a failure. 
1. I have failed more than I should have. 
2. As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
3. I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
 
4) Loss of Pleasure 
0. I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
1. I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to. 
2. I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
3. I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
 
5) Guilty Feelings 
0. I don’t feel particularly guilty 
1. I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
2. I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3. I feel guilty all of the time.   
 
6) Punishment Feelings 
0. I don’t feel I am being punished. 
1. I feel I may be punished. 
2. I expect to be punished. 
3. I feel I am being punished. 
 
7) Self-Dislike 
0. I feel the same about myself as ever. 
1. I have lost confidence in myself. 
2. I am disappointed in myself. 





0. I don’t criticize or blame myself more than usual. 
1. I am more critical of myself than I used to be. 
2. I criticize myself for all of my faults. 
3. I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
9) Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
0. I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1. I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2. I would like to kill myself. 
3. I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
10) Crying 
0. I don’t cry any more than I used to. 
1. I cry more than I used to. 
2. I cry over every little thing. 
3. I feel like crying, but I can’t. 
 
11) Agitation 
0. I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
1. I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
2. I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still. 
3. I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something. 
 
12) Loss of Interest 
0. I have not lost interest in other people or activities. 
1. I am less interested in other people or things than before. 
2. I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
3. It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
 
13) Indecisiveness 
0. I make decisions about as well as ever. 
1. I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
2. I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to. 
3. I have trouble making any decisions. 
 
14) Worthlessness 
0. I do not feel I am worthless. 
1. I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to. 
2. I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
3. I feel utterly worthless.   
 
15) Loss of Energy 
0. I have as much energy as ever. 
1. I have less energy than I used to have. 
2. I don’t have enough energy to do very much. 
16) I don’t have enough energy to do anything 
 
Changes in Sleeping Pattern 
0. I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern. 
1a. I sleep somewhat more than usual. 
1b. I sleep somewhat less than usual. 
2a. I sleep a lot more than usual. 
2b. I sleep a lot less than usual. 
3a. I sleep most of the day. 





0. I am no more irritable than usual. 
1. I am more irritable than usual. 
2. I am much more irritable than usual. 
3. I am irritable all the time. 
 
18) Changes in Appetite 
0. I have not experienced any changes in my appetite. 
1a. My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
1b. My appetite is somewhat greater than usual. 
2a. My appetite is much less than before. 
2b. My appetite is much greater than usual. 
3a. I have no appetite at all. 
3b. I crave food all the time. 
 
19) Concentration Difficulty 
0. I can concentrate as well as ever. 
1. I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
2. It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
3. I find I can’t concentrate on anything. 
 
20) Tiredness or Fatigue 
0. I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.    
1. I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
2. I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
3. I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do.  
 
21) Loss of Interest in Sex 
0. I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1. I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2. I am much less interested in sex now. 




Appendix D: Protocol Script 
Protocol Script: Assessment 
Now I will give you a couple of questionnaires that you will fill out. After you 
have completed the questionnaires, I will ask you a few questions from a psychological 
diagnostic interview. The questions will be about your experiences and feelings. They are 
a standard set of questions that I ask to all participants. Do you have any questions? 
Protocol Script: Task 1 
Now you are ready to start with the first computer task. During this task, you will 
see a series of words on the screen. You must name the color of the printed word as 
quickly as you can. This will continue until this section of the experiment is complete. 
Before the task begins you will practice with a series of words. These words are not part 
of the experiment. After the practice session, you will start the first task. If you have any 
questions, please feel free to ask them now.   
Protocol Script: Task 2 
 Now you are ready to start with the second computer task. During this task 
you will see two pictures on the screen. Both pictures will be of the same person showing 
different expressions. After the pictures will have been on the screen for a brief time, you 
will see an arrow oriented up or down in the place of one of the pictures. If the arrow is 
oriented up, you must press the up arrow key and if the arrow is oriented down you must 
press the down arrow key. You must press the correct key as quickly as possible. If you 




Appendix E: Debriefing  
Debriefing Form 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between intolerance of 
uncertainty and information processing biases that are typically observed in relation to 
anxiety. Information processing denotes the mental processes by which we take in, 
interpret, and store in our memory any information that we encounter. Biased information 
processing means different and selective processing. Biased information processing does 
not mean narrow or distorted processing. Research indicates that information processing 
in people with anxiety is different from that in people without anxiety. Some theories 
propose that people with anxiety devote more time or energy to process potentially 
threatening information and have better memory for such information.  
Intolerance of uncertainty has been conceptualized as a component of anxiety. 
People with high intolerance of uncertainty perceive uncertain events as stressful and 
upsetting. They interpret such events as negative, threatening, and unfair and avoid or are 
unable to act in uncertain situations. People with high intolerance of uncertainty are 
unable to tolerate the possibility of a negative outcome, even if the probability of such 
outcome is very small.  
There are numerous studies investigating information processing biases in 
relationship to anxiety. Currently, there is a need for research to better identify the 
information processing biases and the timeline in which the processing biases unfold in 
relationship to intolerance of uncertainty. This was the goal of the present study. 
Specifically, we are interested in the time difference that it takes to process or to make 
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decisions on stimuli, and if these time differences are different in people with different 
levels of intolerance of uncertainty.  
To this end, you were asked to complete a number of questionnaires assessing 
intolerance of uncertainty and other related measures, as well as to complete two 
computer tasks. The first task was designed to measure the time you needed to name the 
color of print of words, some of which are considered to be threatening or anxiety 
provoking. The second task was designed to measure the time you needed to notice a sign 
that replaced one of two photographs presented on a computer screen. As you may have 
notices some of the pictures displayed faces with a fearful expression which are also 
deemed to be anxiety provoking. 
Your participation in this study may help us discover ways in intolerance of 
uncertainty in related to information processing biases. This research may ultimately help 
in learning much more about the development and maintenance of anxiety, as well as the 
development of treatments aimed at reducing anxiety.  If you have any questions, please 
ask the experimenter now, or contact Dr. Barry Smith at bdsmith@psyc.umd.edu or Earta 




Appendix F: Referral List 
During or as a result of the assessment procedures completed in this study, you 
may realize that you have questions that you would like to discuss further with a mental 
health professional. Below you will find a list of referrals on and off campus in the case 
that you would like learn more information regarding any feelings of frustration, 
discomfort, or depression from a mental health professional. These referrals were 
obtained from an established referral list already in use at the University of Maryland 
Psychology Clinic: 
Judith Sprei, Ph.D.  
4701 Samgamore Rd. Ste. 1355 
Bethesda, MD 20816 
301-229-0065 
Ruth Murray, M.D. 
2340 University Blvd. E. 
Hyattsville, MD 20783 
301-608-9205 
Behavior Therapy Center 
(BTC) of Greater 
Washington 





Dr. William Stixrud & 
Associates 
8720 Georgia Ave., Suite 300 Silver 
Spring, MD 20910  
301-565-0534, Fax:      
301-565-2217 
University of Maryland 
The Center for Health & 
Wellbeing        
University Health Center 
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD 20742 
   301-314-5661 
University of Maryland 
Psychology Clinic 
Biology/Psychology Building, Ste. 
2114, College Park, MD 20742 
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